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"Toward a More Independent Grand Jury:
Recasting and E~forcing the Prosecutor's
puty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
R. MICHAEL CASSIDY*
INTRODUCTION
The bromide that "a grand jury would indict a ham sandwich if the prosecutor
asked it to" reflects a generally accurate belief that the prosecutor exerts primary
control over the flow of information before the grand jury. Notwithstanding this
almost universal recognition that a prosecutor wields great power before the
grand jury, it would probably surprise most lay persons to learn that in the federal
system a prosecutor has no enforceable duty to' present before the grand jury
evidence which exonerates the target of the investigation. The debate over a
prosecutor's grand jury disclosure obligations, apparently laid to rest for the
federal courts by the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United States v.
Williams,! has now been transferred to state courts and bar disciplinary authori-
ties. In this article, I will discuss the contours and ethical underpinnings of a
prosecutor's disclosure obligations before the grand jury, and set forth a new
framework for consideration of such issues.
Just as at its inception in twelfth century England,2 the dual functions of a
* Associate Dean, Boston College Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1985; B.A., University of Notre
Dame, 1982. The author is a fonner state prosecutor, and served as Chief of the Criminal Bureau in the
Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General. The Author wishes to express his gratitude to Professors Aviam
Soifer, Judith McMorrow, Andrew Leipold, and Ray Madoff for reading this work in progress and providing
helpful comments, and to Juliana Capata of the Boston College Law School Class of 1999 and Edward Green of
the Boston College Law School Class of 2001 for their capable research assistance.
1. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
2. The origin of the grand jury has been traced to England and the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. 2 SIR
FREDERIC POLLOCK & WILLIAM MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENOUSH LAW 642 (2d ed. 1923). The first clause
of that assize provided that twelve lay men from each township, upon oath to tell the truth, could make a
presentment to the sheriff of any man suspected of "being a robber or a murderer or a thief." A presentment of
the grand jury did not signify guilt, nor did it lead ineluctably to punishment Such a presentment merely
signified that the person presented was suspected of a crime. The defendant's actual guilt or innocence was
determined at trial, by battle or ordeal, and later, in the 13th century, by trial to a "petty" jury. 1 SIR WILLIAM S.
HOWSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENOUSH LAW 322 (4th ed. 1927). The early settlers in the American colonies had
no established police force to investigate crime, so they imported the English grand jury. See Robert L. Misner,
In Partial Praise ofBoyd: The Grand Jury As Catalyst for Fourth Amendment Change, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 805,
831 (1997). Initially celebrated by the colonists as a vital check on the royal prerogative, the right to indictment
by a grand jury for"capital, or otherwise infamous" crimes was included among the fundamental protections of
the Bill of Rights. U.S. CaNST. amend. V.
361
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3. Colonial grand juries, like their predecessors in England, also took responsibility in civil cases, assuming
quasi-legislative or executive functions such as exposing governmental abuses, criticizing public officials for
failing to maintain highways, bridges, public buildings, and jails, determining tax rates, and proposing
legislation. Stephanie A. Doria, Adding Bite to the Watchdog sBark: Reforming the California Civil Grand Jury
System, 28 PAC. LJ. lll5, 1120 (1997).
4. Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Selrecy, and the Federal Grand Jury, 69
N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 575 (1994).
5. Reflecting on these broad inquisitorial powers, the Supreme Court has said of the grand jury:
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries
is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an
accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
6. See, e.g., Melvin P. Antell, The Modem Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153, 154
(1965) (stating that where probable cause is not shown, it is the duty of the grand jury to refrain from indicting).
7. The switch in composition of the grand jury from twelve to twenty-three laymen has been traced to the
reign of Edward ill in 1368. Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REv. 101, 115-16
(1931).
8. 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 6.02(1) (2d ed. 1996); Note, The Grand Jury as an Investigative Body, 74
HARV. L. REv. 590, 596 (1961). In most states the number of grand jurors is fixed by statute or constitution, and
varies from twelve to twenty-three grand jurors. 38 AM. JUR. 2d § 15 (1999).
9. See, e.g., MASS. R. CRlM. P. 5(g) (allowing a prosecutor to be present during deliberations and voting only
if requested by the grand jurors).
10. This Article employs the term "defendant" to refer, not only to the criminal defendant at trial, but also to
the target of the grand jury investigation although not technically a defendant until indicted.
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grand jury in criminal cases3 are both inquisitorial and accusatorial; that is, grand
juries both investigate crimes and decide which charges to present to the
sovereign for trial. For this reason, the grand jury often has been called both a
"sword" and "shield."4 The grand jury is a "sword" because through the power
of subpoena, the power to compel testimony, and the power to seek immunity for
witnesses, a grand jury may ferret out crimes.5 It is a "shield," because through
informed and independent decisionmaking, the grand jury may act to protect
innocent persons from accusations not supported by probable cause.6 Despite the
historical duality of the grand jury's role, serious questions have been raised as to
the ability of the grand jury to perfonn its shield function.
In many states and the federal court system, the American grand jury is
composed of twenty-three lay citizens.7 Its work is conducted in total secrecy,
and the modem grand jury receives guidance and instruction from only one
advocate - the prosecutor. The prosecutor is responsible for making an opening
statement, examining witnesses, introducing physical evidence, preparing the
draft indictment, and instructing the jury on the legal elements of the. crimes
presented in the proposed charges.8 In some states, the prosecutor may even
remain in the room while the grand jury deliberates, purportedly to assist in the
event that any jurors have questions.9
In sharp contrast, counsel for a defendant10 plays no role in the grand jury
except silently to advise should the client be called as a witness. Otherwise,
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defense counsel is not even allowed in the grand jury room. 11 Neither the rules of
evidence,12 nor the constitutional rights of a defendant to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures,13 to confront the witnesses against him, and
to testify in his own defense14 apply in grand jury proceedings.
Perhaps because the prosecutor's power at this early stage of criminal
proceedings is paramount, grand juries return indictments in an extremely high
percentage of cases. 15 Not surprisingly, the status of the grand jury as an
independent and quasi-judicial body capable of screening out unmeritorious
charges repeatedly has been called into question. Much has been written about
the failure or the inability of the grand jury to fulfill its historical function of
screening out unmeritorious charges through the return of a "no bill." Once
conceived as frontline security for the innocent against "hasty, malicious, and
oppressive persecution," 16 the grand jury, according to some experts, has become
a mere tool, or "rubber stamp," of the prosecutor. 17 Many commentators in
recent years have called for reform of the grand jury18 and many states have
abolished the grand jury altogether in favor of other methods of pre-trial case
screening, such as the use of judicial probable cause hearings. 19
11. In the federal grand jury, counsel for a witness is not allowed in the grand jury room during questioning
of his client. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976). Cf. N.Y. LAW § 190.52 (allowing counsel
for grand jury witness to be present during examination). If the witness seeks legal advice before answering a
particular question, the witness must request a break in the proceedings to consult with counsel outside the
grand jury room. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) (noting that "because the grand jury
does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and
accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial");
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ArroRNEYs' MANUAL, (9-11.151 (1999) (stating that if a witness has a
lawyer, a grand jury will allow a reasonable opportunity to leave the grand jury room to consult with counsel).
12. FED. R. EVID. 1l01(d)(2).
13. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 64 (1906) (establishing a reasonableness test for grand jury subpoenas
rather than a probable cause test); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1979) (refusing to apply
exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings).
14. United States v. Fritz, 852 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988), cat. denied, 489 U.S. 1027 (1989).
15. According to statistics compiled by the Executive Office for United States Attorneys in Washington,
D.C., in 1995, the U.S. Attorneys initiated 22,856 proceedings before federal grand juries. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS' STATISTICAL REPoRT 6 (1997). Of those investigations initiated before the
grand jury in 1995. in only thirty-nine cases was an indictment not returned. Thus, for this one-year period,
federal grand juries returned an indictment against some defendant in over ninety nine and eight tenths percent
of the cases initiated. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995 Table 1.3. (visited Oct. 12,
1999) <http:/www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjsJpub/ pdf/cfjs95.pdf>.
16. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
17. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REv.
260, 269 (1995); Antell, supra note 6, at 156.
18. See Peter L. Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent
Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463, 558-62 (1980); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the
Grand Jury, 64 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMlNOLOOY 174,174 (1973); Gerald B. Lefcourt, High TImefor a Bill ofRights
for the Grand Jury. 2-5 NAT'L Ass'N CRIM. DEF. Arr'ys 1998 (visited Oct. 12, 1999) <http://209.70.38.3/
CHAMPIONIPRESPAGEl98apr.htm>.
19. Although the right to indictment by grand jury "for capital, or otherwise infamous crime" is embodied in
the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that this protection is not so inimical to the
concept of ordered liberty that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires it in state courts.
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,533 (1884). Twenty-five states now allow the initiation of criminal charges .
for felonies by information, and over half the states have abolished the grand jury altogether. See Morse, supra
note 7, at 122; Leipold, supra note 17, at 314. '
20. See Hale, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (discussing plenary investigatory powers of grand jury).
21. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRAcnCE §3:01 (2d ed. 1997). In both England and
the colonies, the grand jury's right to report was exercised most frequently in cases involving public corruption
or government misfeasance, thus allowing citizens to perform some oversight of their government via a sanction
short of indictment. Barry Jeffrey Stem, Note, Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials Through Grand Jury
Reports, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 83 (1987). Today, special grand juries impaneled by the federal courts are
authorized to issue reports on matters relating to corruption by public officials and organized crime. See 18
U.S.C. § 3333.
22. The legislatures in only twelve states have conferred upon prosecuting attorneys, acting independently of
a duly constituted grand jury, the general authority to issue subpoenas duces tecum during criminal investiga-
tions (so called "investigative subpoenas"). See H. Morley Swingle, CrimiTlllllnvestigative Subpoenas: How to
Get Them, How to Fight Them, 54 J. Mo. B. 15 (1998). .
23. Leipold, supra note 17, at 321.
24. Arenella, supra note 18, at 558-62.
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Those jurisdictions that have abandoned the grand jury generally have done so'
at significant cost, because the inquisitorial function of the grand jury is not easily
replaced. In situations where an arrest has not been made and law enforcement
officials are seeking to "solve" a crime, the grand jury may playa unique and
valuable investigative role; it may subpoena a witness to appear and answer
questions under the pains and penalties of perjury; it may request a court to
immunize a witness who asserts his right not to incriminate himself; it may
command the production of documents and other physical evidence such as
handwriting, voice, and blood samples; and, it may assess, in deliberative
fashion, the relative credibility of witnesses whose accounts differ from one
another. 20 In lieu of an indictment, the grand juries of many states are authorized
to publish their findings in the form of a "report" to the court which impaneled
them, recommending civil redress or systemic reform.21 These important pre-
charging investigatory tools are not available to prosecutors or police officers in
most states unless they are acting through and on behalf of a duly constituted
grand jury.22 Thus, commentators who call for the wholesale abandonment of the
grand jury may be trading away important inquisitorial tools in retuni for a more
balanced case screening process.
To date, proposals for grand jury reform have not been fruitful. Professor
Andrew Leipold has proposed, among other possible reforms, replacing the
grand jury with a body of legal experts acting independently of the government.23
Professor Peter Arenella has called for increasing the procedural protections
available to targets of a grand jury investigation, such as by extending the
exclusionary rule and the ban on hearsay to grand jury proceedings.24 Because
these proposals wouid entail a drastic reformulation of the grand jury's historic
accusatory role, they have not gained political momentum. A more appropriate
effort to improve the grand jury's screening function must be sensitive to the
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preliminary nature of the grand jury's inquiry, yet strong enough to ~ard against
outrageous government conduct.
Grand jury refonn efforts also must be viewed as part and parcel of a recent
movement to curtail prosecutorial discretion generally, which reflects a popular
reaction to prosecutorial overreaching. While calls for grand jury refonn pre-
dated Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation into the affairs of
President Clinton, the Whitewater investigation clearly has intensified the debate.
In 1997, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Hyde Amendment,
which allows certain defendants who prevail in criminal proceedings to sue the
government to recover costs and attorneys fees, provided that they establish that
the indictment was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. ,,25 In 1998, Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed, the Citizens Protection Act (infonnally
known as the "McDade Amendment"), as part of the 1998 Omnibus Consoli-
dated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. Provisions of. the
McDade Amendment make federal prosecutors subject to the local ethical rules
of the states in which they practice.26 As the title of the Citizens Protection Act
implies, one of its goals is to protect targets and witnesses of criminal investiga-
tions by curtailing prosecutorial discretion.27
These recent restrictions on prosecutorial power confinn that most legislators,
as well as many practitioners and commentators, believe that the grand jury has
lost its ability to act as a "shield" by screening out unmeritorious charges. In
addition, there is a widespread view that this erosion of the grand jury's ability to
act as a check on prosecutorial power is beyond repair. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court continues to act as ifa grandjury indictment is a stronger or more valid finding of
probable cause than a criminal complaint or information.28 Because, for some constitu-
tional purposes, a grand jury determination of probable cause obviates the need for
judicial review of probable cause at a preliminary hearing, it is incumbent upon
prosecutors to ensure that the grand jury fulfills its essential screening function. It is
concomitantly incumbent upon courts and commentators to seek workable mecha-
nisms to hold prosecutors accountable in fulfilling this ethical responsibility.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(1994).
26. 28 U.S.c. § 530B (1998).
27. An early draft of the McDade Amendment included a provision, not included in the final bill, that would
have required the Judicial Conference of the United States to consider and report on a proposed amendment to
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 allowing witnesses before a federal grandJury to have counsel physically present in the room
when they testify. H.R. 4276, 105th Congo (1998).
28. In Gerstein v. Pugh, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that a grand jury indictment substitntes for a
judicial finding of probable cause and obviates the need for hearing when there is pre-trial detention. 420 U.S.
103,118 n.19 (1975). Thus, a defendant charged by information or complaint who is arrested and unable to post
bail is entitled constitutionally to a preliminary hearing before a magistrate within forty-eight hours ofhis arrest,
while a defendant arrested pursuant to an indictment warrant has no similar protection. The differences for a
criminal defendant are grave, because he may be detained for long periods of time following. indictment without
any judicial finding of probable cause. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) (no preliminary examination required after
indictment).
I. ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM
To establish the framework for this discussion of a prosecutor's ethical
responsibilities before the grand jury, consider the following illustration:
A group ofteenage boys from an affluent suburb are charged with the rape of
a mentally handicapped female classmate. The rape allegedly occurred in the
basement ofone boy's home, with each boy allegedly participating or encour-
This Article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, in which the
Court struck down such an attempt by the Tenth Circuit to impose an obligation
on federal prosecutors to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. After setting forth the contours of the problem in Section I of the Article, I
argue in Section II that the Williams case was wrongly decided for two principal
reasons. First, it offered only a one-sided analysis of the historical function of the
grand jury. Second, it misapprehended the permissible supervisory role of the
federal courts. More importantly, I discuss how the Supreme Court's failure to act
in this area does not preclude, but in fact invites, legislative or judicial action on
the state level aimed at preventing prosecutorial abuse and excesses in the grand
jury.
States interested in more accurate, independent, and informed case screening
by grand juries should require prosecutors, either by decision, statute, or rule of
criminal procedure, to refrain from distorting the evidence before the grand jury
by omitting evidence in their possession that substantially negates the defen-
dant's guilt. By doing so, states would at least be assured that the prosecutor does
not mislead the grand jury~ without a fair presentation of the evidence, the grand
jury cannot fulfill its obligation to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant has committed a crime. Imposition of such a rule
barring distortion of evidence before the grand jury would be consistent with, if
not arguably compelled by, a prosecutor's general duty of fairness under the
Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, which are discussed in Section III. Section
IV explores why a distortion test would also be more workable than the
"substantial exculpatory evidence" approach taken by many states.
My proposal is not without significant costs in terms of the judicial resources
needed to review a prosecutor's presentation of evidence before the grand jury
when a defendant raises an appropriate claim of error. These challenges would
most often take the form of motions to dismiss indictments on the ground that the
prosecutor failed to fulfill his duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. In Section V of the Article, I propose a framework for consideration of such
motions and an appropriate remedy for a prosecutor's failure to present certain
substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. This solution addresses the
tension between the state's interests in conserving judicial resources in its review
of preliminary proceedings, and in encouraging a more balanced and fair grand
jury presentation by the government.
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If the prosecution calls before the grand jury those psychiatric experts who
testify that the victim was mentally defective, is the prosecutor also required to
call as witnesses or summarize the testimony of experts hired by the defense who
contradict this medical conclusion? This problem illustrates a recurring dilemma
faced by prosecutors: how to evaluate potentially exculpatory evidence during a
criminal investigation, and whether to present such evidence to a grand jury. The
problem arises in myriad forms every day in jurisdictions across this country, but
essentially boils down to two questions: (1) should the grand jury, whose sole
task is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant
has committed a crime, hear evidence that undermines the state's theory, thereby
transforming the grand jury from a merely accusatory body into a mini-trier of
ultimate fact; and, (2) if so, how does a prosecutor determine whether a particular
piece of evidence is exculpatory, without weighing credibility and abandoning or
undercutting the official's traditional adversarial role?
For many prosecutors, the hypothetical just described poses an easy question
for which the,y have a straightforward answer: the defendant will have a chance to
call the medical experts to testify at trial before a petit jury, where the ultimate
determination of guilt or innocence will be made. Therefore, they would assert,
the prosecutor has no ethical, legal, or moral responsibility to make this evidence
aging some form of sexual assault on the victim, including fellatio, digital
penetration, and penetration with a baseball bat.
The defense was consent; that is, that the victim instigated the sexual
encounter at the school parking lot, followed the teenagers to one of their
homes, and willingly participated in the group sexual activity with the defen-
dants. The victim, whom the defendants had known since childhood, was
portrayed by the defense as sexually aggressive. Under the state:SO applicable
aggravated sexual assault law, however, physical coercion orforce need not be
proved on a charge ofsexual assault if "the victim is one whom the actor knew
or should have known was . .. mentally defective. "
In a motion by the prosecution before the family court to try the juvenile
defendants as adults, the prosecution introduced evidence from psychiatric
experts that the victim:SO IQ was 64, six points below normal intelligence; that
she was mildly retarded; and that the defendants knew, or should have known
that she was "slow." Defense experts, however, testified at the preliminary
hearing that the victim:SO mental condition was borderline; that while she was
arguably "slow," this slight mental defect would not have been apparent to the
average teenage boy, and that it would not have affected her ability to
understand her right to refuse sex.
The state family court granted the prosecution leave to try the juveniles as
adults, and the prosecution proceeded to the grand jury. In a letter written to
the prosecutor during the grand jury proceedings, counsel for the defendants
asked the prosecutor to introduce before the grand jury evidence from their
medical experts supporting their defense that the victim was not mentally
defective under the terms ofthe applicable statute.
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II. IN SEARCH OF A SOLUTION: AN OPPoRTUNITY LOST
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known to what is essentially only a charging body. Other prosecutors, whether
out of a broader view of their responsibilities or from an abundance of ethical
caution, would introduce this evidence, having in mind the grand jury's important
screening function, and their· own responsibility to pursue justice rather than
simply to advocate for convictions.
The fact that there could be radically different approaches among experienced
prosecutors to this frequently recurring problem should give us great pause.
Presumably, all would agree that whether a grand jury chooses to indict or not
indict a particular defendant certainly depends on a variety of factors, but one of
them should not be the individual moral compass of the particular prosecutor
assigned the case. Notwithstanding the radically different approaches to this
problem taken among prosecutors at both the state and federal levels, most courts
and commentators have been strikingly unhelpful in assisting prosecutors to
define the parameters of their responsibility - if any - to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury.
Most federal appellate courts considering the issue prior to 1992 ruled that a
prosecutor does not have a general duty to present evidence favorable to a
defendant to a grand jury. They reasoned that such a duty would transform the
grand jury from an accusatory body into a finder of ultimate fact and would
impose substantial resource demands on the judiciary by requiring review of
grand jury presentations.
Many courts reaching this result relied on the Supreme Court's 1956 decision
in Costello v. United States,29 in which the Court ruled that an indictment based
solely on hearsay evidence does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Reacting to
concerns that allowing challenges to the quality or sufficiency of the evidence
before the grand jury would heavily burden judicial resources with preliminary
hearings, the Costello court stated that "[a]n indictment returned by a legally
constituted and unbiased grand jury ... if valid on its face, is enough to call for
trial of the charge on the merits.,,30 Indeed, the Court continued, "neither the
Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of
evidence upon which grandjuries must act. ,,31 After Costello, lower courts had
little trouble interpreting this admonition to mean that courts need not entertain
claims that a prosecutor had omitted exculpatory evidence from his grand jury
presentation.32
29. 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
30. [d. at 363.
31. [d. at 362.
32. See United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d. 509, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d
927, 937 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Civella, 666 F.2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508,512 (9th Cir. 1976).
33. For the purposes of constitutionally mandated pre-trial discovery, exculpatory evidence has been defined
broadly as "evidence favorable to the accused." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.s. 83, 87 (1963). Stated simply, the
prosecution must disclose to the defense prior to trial any "information known to or available to them which
may develop doubt about the government's narrative." United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1449 (D.
Colo. 1997). The Brady line of cases have established a broad definition of constitutionally exculpatory
evidence, including evidence which would impeach a government witness (such as prior inconsistent statements
or inconsistent identification), evidence which would show bias on the part of a government witness (such as
promises, rewards, or inducements), evidence which would cast doubt on any essential element of the crime
charged, or evidence which would suggest that someone other than the defendant committed the crime.
Exculpatory evidence includes not only documents or testimony admissible in evidence, but also inadmissible
materials which, if defense counsel had access to them, might lead to admissible evidence. See United States v.
LaRouche Campaign, 695 F. Supp. 1265, 1279 (D. Mass. 1988).
34. Compare United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723,728 (lOth Cif. 1987) ("substantial exculpatory evidence
... must be revealed to the grand jury"), United States v. Romano, 706 F,2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A
dismissal is warranted only in extreme circumstances ... the prosecutor is not obligated to present all possible
defenses to a grand jury,"), and United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F,2d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983) (" 'while
prosecutors need not present to the grand jury all circumstances which might be considered exculpatory, they
must present evidence which clearly negates the target's guilt.' ") (quoting United States v. Dorfman, 532 F,
Supp. 1118, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1981», with United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The
prosecution was not required to present the grand jury with evidence which would tend to negate guilt "), and
United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, 1135 (6th Cir. 1975) ("If indictments were to be held open to challenge
on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed.... An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ... is
enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits.").
35. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,38 (1992).
::;
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Amore serious and more difficult question was whether prosecutors had a duty
present to the grand jury substantially exculpatory evidence, that is, evidence
hich directly negated or contradicted evidence of the defendant's guilt. Unlike
igeneral exculpatory evidence, which may simply cast some doubt on the
~'credibility of government witnesses (such as impeachment evidence),33 evidence
'that affinnatively suggests that the defendant did not commit the crime, or that
'someone else did, is directly relevant to the grand jury's accusatory function. If
believed, it suggests that there is no probable cause to indict. Prior to 1992, the
circuits were split on the question of whether prosecutors have an obligation to
present to the grand jury substantially exculpatory evidence in their possession.34
In 1992, the Supreme Court resolved this issue in United States v. Williams. A
federal grand jury indicted John Williams, an investor from Tulsa, Oklahoma, on
seven counts of bank fraud for knowingly making false statements intended to
influence the actions of a federally insured financial institution. Specifically, the
indictments alleged that the defendant misstated his financial position on balance
sheets provided to the bank in support of his loan application by: 1) listing under
"current assets" $6 million in notes receivable from venture capital companies
he had an interest in, notwithstanding that these investments were highly
speculative and not reducible to cash value in the short tenn; and 2) reporting
under "income" the interest he received on these notes, notwithstanding that
such interest was funded entirely by his own loans to the company.35 Williams
moved to dismiss the indictments, arguing that the government failed to fulfill its
36. ld. at 39.
37.ld.
38.ld.
39. /d.
40. See United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen substantial exculpatory evidence
is discovered in the course of an investigation, it must be revealed to the grand jury.").
41. Williams, 504 U.S. at 39.
42. /d. at 40. The dissenters in Williams argued that certiorari was improvidently granted because the
government had not argued in either the district court or in the court of appeals that federal courts are without
power to supervise a prosecutor's presentation of evidence in the grand jury, but had argued only that the
particular evidence left undisclosed in Williams did not constitute "substantially exculpatory" material within
the ambit of the Tenth Circuit's Page rule. See id. at 70. The majority not only reached the merits of the question
on which certiorari was granted, but assumed for the purposes of its opinion that the evidence left undisclosed in
Williams was "substantial." See id. at 55.
43. See id. at 45, 51.
44. See id. at 54-55.
45. See id. at 50. In ruling that the federal courts had no general supervispry authority to fashion rules of
superintendence over the grand jury, the Supreme Court clearly left open the possibility that a similar rule
obligation to present "substantially exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury?6
His lawyers argued that the government failed to introduce to the grand jury
federal tax returns and Williams' testimony in a contemporaneous bankruptcy
proceeding, both of which established that Williams consistently reported these
notes (and interest on the notes) as current assets and income.37 According to
Williams, his consistent treatment of these notes in other reporting forums belied
an intent to mislead the banks, which was an essential element of the crime
charged.38
The district court agreed and dismissed the indictments, ruling that the
evidence created "a reasonable doubt about [the defendant's] guilt" and "rendered
the grand jury's decision to indict gravely suspect.,,39 Applying its ruling
in United States v. Page,40 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the district court's conclusion that the government possessed and withheld
substantial exculpatory information from the grand jury was not clearly er-
roneous.41
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of "whether an
indictment may be dismissed because the government failed to present exculpa-
tory evidence to the grandjury."42 The respondent argued both: 1) that imposing·
such an obligation on prosecutors is necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of indictment by a grand jury for serious crimes; and, 2) that the Tenth
Circuit's disclosure rule, independent of the Fifth Amendment, was consistent
with and supported by its general supervisory power over the grand jury.43 In a
majority opinion by Justice Scalia, a sharply-divided Court reversed the Tenth
Circuit, ruling that dismissal of an indictment for failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury was not proper.44 The opinion is remarkable not for its
result, but for its reasoning. The majority ruled that federal courts are without
general superintendence power concerning the nature or quality of evidence
presented to the grand jury.45
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Williams argued that the Tenth Circuit's disclosure rule could be justified "as a
sort of Fifth Amendment 'common law.' ,,46 Rejecting this argument, the Court
ruled that the Tenth Circuit's disclosure rule was not a necessary means to assure
the defendant's constitutioual right to "an independent and informed grand
jury.,,47 Focusing on the accusatory role of the grand jury, Justice Scalia stated
that "the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether
there is an adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.,,48 He added:
The [disclosure] rule would neither preserve nor enhance the traditional
functioning of the institution that the Fifth Amendment demands. To the
contrary, requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence as well as
inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming
it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.49
Justice Scalia rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment assures putative
defendants the right to a balanced presentation of evidence before the grand jury,
noting that both in England and in the colonies, a person under investigation had
no right to appear before the grand jury himself or to present a defense through
others. Because the grand jury had no obligation to hear such defense evidence
were it to be tendered,50 Justice Scalia refused to "convert a non-existent duty of
the grand jury itself into an obligation of the prosecutor." 51 His opinion reasoned
that because the Fifth Amendment common law of the grand jury would not be
abridged "if the grand jury itself chooses to hear no more evidence than that
which suffices to convince it an indictment is proper, ,,52 to require a prosecutor to
present exculpatory evidence, while denying that the grand jury has an obligation
to consider it, "would be quite absurd."53
While Justice Scalia is correct that in England a putative defendant had no
right to testify or to present a defense before the grand jury,54 it does not
ineluctably follow from this historical fact that the later enacted Fifth Amend-
ment does not require a prosecutor to present such evidence were it to come into
his possession.55 The placement of the right to a grand jury indictment in the Fifth
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mandating disclosure of exculpatory evidence could be fashioned through statute or a rule of criminal
procedure. "[I]f there is an advantage to the proposal, Congress is free to prescribe it." Id. at 55.
46. Id. at 51. Respondent in Williams did not directly allege that the prosecutor's failure to present
substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right to indictment by
such a body; rather, he argued that the "common law" of the Fifth Amendment empowered the Tenth Circuit to
supervise the nature of evidence presented to the grand jury. Jd. at 39.
47. Id. at 51 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962».
48. Id.
49. Jd.
50. See id. at 51-52.
51. Id. at 53.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 52.
54. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIffi LAWS OF ENGLAND 300 (1769) (grand jury is "only to
hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution"), cited in Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73, 84 (1904).
55. Certainly Justice Scalia is correct that if such a disclosure rule existed, a wise defense counsel who
'I
II
If
II
it
IIi
1'1
: 1.1
' I
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wished to infonn the grand jury of evidence favorable to the accused would simply present exculpatory
evidence to the prosecutor in advance of an indictment, knowing that the prosecutor would be under a limited <
duty to turn this evidence over to the grand jury. See United States v. Williams, 504 u.s. 36. 52 (1992).
However, this result does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, allow the defendant to "circumnavigate" the rule that .~
the defendant has no right to appear or present evidence to the grand jury; prosecutors would only be obliged to ';
present substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, not every conceivable piece of mitigating'
infonnation or impeaching evidence provided by counsel for the target. ld.
56. Historical examples abound, both in England and the colonies, of grand juries exercising this screening
function by "no billing" meritless or unpopular charges. In 1681, a London grandjury in England returned BIl
"ignoramus," or no bill, on charges of treason against the popular Earl of Shaftesbury and his follower, Stephen
Colledge, who had challenged the authority of King Charles n to reestablish the authority of the Catholic
Church in England. Antell, supra note 6, at 156. In the colonies, unpopular laws were often nullified by grand
juries who refused to indict under them. In 1765, for example, a grand jury in Boston refused to indict the,
leaders of the Stamp Act Riot due to the unpopularity of the law and the perceived tyranny of the King. See
Elizabeth G. McKendree, United States v. Williams: Antonin:r Costello - How the Grand Jury Lost the Aid of
the Courts as a Check on Prosecutorial Misconduct, 37 How. L.J. 49, 57 (1993).
57. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1992).
58. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,363 (1956).
Amendment, along with other key individual liberties such as the right not to be a
witness against oneself and the right to due process of law, suggests that the grand
jury was viewed as some form of safeguard between the government and its
citizens. The prosecutor is an arm of the government, but the grand jury is a body
of the people. It is not inconsistent, and surely not absurd, to suggest that the
grand jury has no obligation to hear or consider a particular piece of evidence, but
also that the prosecutor has some obligation to present it. In the former case, the
finder of fact is given the choice of what evidence to consider; in the latter, the
government deprives that very deliberative body of the opportunity to make such
a choice.
Justice Scalia also undervalued the historical screening function of the grand 1
jury. The majority in Williams concluded that requiring a prosecutor to disclose 1
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would do little to further the grand jury's
accusatory function because its duty is simply to charge, not to determine guilt or
innocence. But, both in England and in the colonies, one of the roles of the grand
jury was to screen out unmeritorious charges.56 Where exculpatory evidence is so
substantial that to introduce it would actually lead the grand jury to conclude that
there is no probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime,
nondisclosure compromises this core screening function.
On the Fifth Amendment issue, the majority in Williams clearly felt constrained by
the Court's prior mandate in Costello not to inquire into the nature or sufficiency of
evidence presented to the grand jury.57 In Costello, the Court had observed:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the
merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to
determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury.
This is not required by the Fifth Amendment.58
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Although the express holding in Costello dealt only with judicial review of the
competence of evidence before the grand jury (hearsay), the above cited dicta
expressed the Court's refusal to review the "competency and adequacy" of
evidence before the grand jury. This dicta was repea!ed eighteen years later in
Calandra, where the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule in the grand
jury to evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, stating that "the
validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence
considered.,,59 By the time Williams was decided in 1992, the Supreme Court on
two separate occasions had stated its disinclination to allow federal courts to
review grand jury presentments to determine whether probable cause existed to
support the crime charged, without expressly ruling so on facts properly before
it.60 Having traveled down this road, the Court felt constrained in Williams to
forestall challenges to the prosecutor's decisions about what evidence to present
to the grand jury: "It would make little sense, we think, to abstain from reviewing
the evidentiary support for the grand jury's judgment while scrutinizing the
sufficiency of the prosecutor's presentation.,,61 As a practical matter, the Court
simply promoted efficiency over fairness. The Court did not want to commit the
judicial resources necessary to review the scope or quality of evidence presented
to the grand jury, worrying that the need to rule on such motions would "consume
'valuable judicial time' ,,62 and engage the courts in "preliminary trials on the
merits.,,63
Because the Court concluded that the common law of the Fifth Amendment
had not been violated by the prosecutor's conduct in Williams, and because no
specific statute or rule of criminal procedure required the prosecutor to present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the Court determined that the Tenth
Circuit was without power to create a common law disclosure rule by judicial
decision.64 Justice Scalia concluded that federal courts lack any general supervi-
sory power over the grand jury because grand juries are not "judicial" proceed-
ings.65 He relied on the fact that the grand jury is not mentioned in the body of the
Constitution, but only in the Bill of Rights, to support his conclusion that it
belongs to none of the three branches of government.66 He also pointed both to
the scope of the grand jury's power,67 and to the manner in which it was
59. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,344-45 (1974).
60. The Court in Williams cited with approval United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727, 738 (C.C.N.D. N.Y.
1852), in which Justice Reed, riding circuit, found "[no] authority for looking into and revising the judgment of
the grand jury upon the evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded upon
sufficient proof." Williams, 504 U.S. at 54.
61. Id
62. ./d. at 55.
63. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350.
64. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 46-47.
65. Seeid.at47.
66.Id.
67. Id. at 48. Justice Scalia noted that the grand jury, unlike a court, conducts its proceedings in secrecy; that
exercised,68 to distinguish it from Article III courts. Having concluded that the
grand jury is not part of the judiciary, the majority in Williams ruled that a court's
power to regulate grand jury proceedings is not as broad as its supervisory power;
over its own proceedings.69 Therefore, the Court proclaimed that the judiciary's
supervisory power over the grand jury should be limited to situations where the
constitution, a statute, or a rule has been violated.70
On the separation of powers issue, the Court in Williams struggled to
distinguish its holding only three Terms earlier in Bank ofNova Scotia v. United
States.71 In Bank ofNova Scotia, which also emanated from the Tenth Circuit, the
Court had ruled that dismissal of an indictment for alleged prosecutorial miscon-
duct before the grand jury was improper, where there was no showing that the •
violation "substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict" and no
"grave doubt" that the indictment was free from the substantial influence of such
violations.72 The challenged conduct of the prosecutor in Bank of Nova Scotia.
was multifarious, and included: allegedly violating Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 6(d) by allowing unauthorized persons into the grand jury room;'
violating the secrecy provisions of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e) by
disclosing grand jury material to civil tax auditors and to other grand jury
witnesses; and, intentionally presenting false and misleading evidence to the
grand jury.73 The Supreme Court ruled that, even if the district court was correct
in finding that they occurred, none of the violations prejudiced the defendant.
Significantly, the Court did not rule that it was without power to dismiss the
indictments where prejudice was found. Yet in Williams, the majority unconvinc-
ingly limited the holding of Bank ofNova Scotia by ruling that a federal court has
power to dismiss an indictment only for "a violation of one of those 'few, clear
rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to .
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a grand jury swears in its own witnesses; that a grand jury's jurisdiction is not limited to a specific case or
controversy; and, that the target of a grand jury need not be infonned of the nature of the proceedings against
him. Seeid.
68. Justice Scalia noted that certain constitutional protections available in judicial proceedings have no
application before the grand jury, such as double jeopardy and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; moreover,
evidence gathered in violation of a target's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination will not undermine
the validity of an indictment.ld. at 49.
69. See William.f, 504 U.S. at 50 ("These authorities suggest that any power federal courts may have to
fashion, on their own initiative, rules ofgrand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable 00
the power they maintain over their own proceedings.").
70. See id. at 48,50. The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and
Thomas, criticized the majority's rather facile conclusion that because the grand jury is not an Article ill court,
such courts have no general superintendence power to supervise grand jury proceedings, finding such logic
"unpersuasive." Id. at 66 (Stevens, J.. dissenting). Stevens correctly cited many instances in which the grand
jury relies on the courts to fulfill its responsibilities, such as enforcing summonses and comMlling witnesses 00
testify.ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (describing the grand
jury as an "appendage of the court."».
71. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
72. ld. at 256 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 457 U.S. 66, 78 (1986».
73. ld. at 259-60.
ensure the integrity of the grand jury's functions.' ..74 However, the improprieties
· complained of in Bank of Nova Scotia were clearly not limited to violations of
· Rule 6 or the Constitution,75 and Justice Scalia's transparent attempt to limit the
Williams holding to these few subsets of prosecutorial misconduct did not escape
the stinging critique of the dissenters.76
The Court in Williams also understated the extent to which it had allowed
judicial oversight of grand jury proceedings in the past. In the forty years
preceding Williams, for example, the Court was very active in protecting the
· process of selecting grand jurors from racial and gender discrimination.77 The
Court has also indicated its willingness to limit a grand jury's subpoena power,78
and to dismiss indictments when a prosecutor intentionally presents perjured
testimony to the grand jury.79 Not all of these forms of misconduct by or before
the grand jury is expressly forbidden by Constitution, statute, or·rule. As recently
as its opinion in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court looked instead to whether the
misconduct complained of had so compromised the integrity of the grand jury as
74. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992) (quoting Mechanik, 457 U.s. at 74 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring» .
75. The claims that the prosecutor (1) intentionally presented false evidence to the grand jury and (2) berated
an expert witness outside of the grand jury room clearly were not based on a clearly defined statute or rule, yet
the majority in Bank ofNova Scotia applied a harmless error analysis to the claims of error, implying that had
the misconduct prejudiced the defendant, dismissal would have been proper. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 2~O, 261--62 (1988). Defendant in Bank of Nova Scotia did not argue that the prosecutor's
intentional presentation offalse evidence to the grandjury made him an accomplice to a violation of 18 U.S.C.
, § 1623, which prohibits perjury by a witness before the grand jury.
76. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 65 ("Unquestionably, the plain implication of that discussion [in Bank ofNova
Scotia] is that if the misconduct, even though not expressly forbidden by any written rule, had played a critical
role in persuading the jury to return the indictment, dismissal would have been required.").
77. See, e.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979) ("Selection of members of a grand jury because
they are of one race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of
the judicial process. "); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) ("the grand jury ... serves the inv:aluable
function in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual,
minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an
intimidating power or by malice and personal ill will."); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 288 (1950) ("it was
[the commissioners'] duty to familiarize themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the
county without regard to race and color. They did not do so here, and the result has been racial discrimina-
tion."); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195-96 (1946) ("The systematic and intentional exclusion of
women deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to have in our democratic
society: [T]here is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.").
78. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
79. See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 260 ("Because the record does not reveal any prosecutorial
misconduct with respect to these summaries, they provide no ground for dismissing the indictment."). See also
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) ("[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be
satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in
truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury
by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured."); United States v. Basurato, 497 F,2d 781,787 (9th Cir.
1974) ("Permitting Ii defendant to stand trial on an indictment which the government knows is based on
perjured testimony cannot comport with this 'fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice.' ")
(quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956».
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80. Bank ofNova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986».
81. In Ballard, for example, the Court exercised its supervisory authority to prevent exclusion of women ,~
from service on grand juries, rather than relying on an express constitutional or statutory provision. Ballard v. .'
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 190 (1946).
82. 504 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973».
83. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
84. If exculpatory evidence is of such weight that it is likely to convince a trial jury to acquit, most sensible
prosecutors would prefer that the grand jury "screen out" a case than that a weak indictment be followed bya
prolonged trial and acquittal. Nonetheless, there are a number of rational but pernicious reasons that some
prosecutors would not present the grand jury with credible evidence supporting the defendant's innocence. See f
infra note 166 and accompanying text.
to render its proceedings "fundamentally unfair.,,80 When it was deemed
important enough, the Court was willing to intervene to protect the integrity of
the grand jury process. Justice Scalia's newly-minted and exclusive reliance on
violations of express constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules as the bellwether
of when a court may intervene in grand jury proceedings without violating
principles of separation of powers appears simply to have been made up out of
whole cloth.81
In relying on principles of separation of powers to reach its decision, Williams
recognized that "the Fifth Amendment's 'constitutional guarantee [of indictment
by grand jury] presupposes an investigative body acting independently of either
prosecuting attorney or judge.' ,,82 Yet total independence from both bodies is
impossible. The grand jury cannot act except on the adviCe and direction of the
prosecutor, and prosecutorial misconduct cannot be prevented and deterred
except with the aid and intervention of the courts. By refusing to allow courts to
exercise supervisory authority over grand juries, the Court may be preserving the
grand jury's independence from the judiciary, but only at the cost of maximizing
the grand jury's dependence on prosecutors.
Over twenty five years ago, the Supreme Court described the function of the
grand jury as follows: "[I]t serves the invaluable function in our society of
standing between the accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual,
minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason
or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personall11 wili.,,83 A:
prosecutor who knows of evidence that negates the defendant's guilt, and who
consciously chooses not to disclose it to the grand jury, either does not personally
believe the evidence is credible, or seeks to gain some form of leverage by
indicting an innocent defendant.84 In the former case, he is imposing his
"intimidating power" on the grand jury by substituting his will for the collective
and informed judgment of that deliberative body. In the latter case, he is acting
"maliciously" by pursuing an indictment not supported by probable cause. The
Court in Williams failed to recognize that either fonn of motivation is paradigmati·
cally what the drafters of the Fifth Amendment sought to prevent when they
placed the grand jury as a shield between the people and the sovereign.
Nondisclosure of substantial exculpatory evidence makes the grand jury exclu,-
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III. INEFFECTIJAL ETHICAL RULES AND STANDARDS
sively a tool of the prosecutor, rather than a bulwark between the prosecutor and
the individual.
85. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Ennes Canon 5 (1908) ("The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.").
86. Young v. United States. 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935».
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
88. [d.
.j
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This special duty [to seek justice] exists because: (1) the prosecutor represents
the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers, such as in the selection of which cases to prosecute; (2)
during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may make
decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public
interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal justice the
accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts.87
Despite this statement, Model Code Ee 7-13 contains only a general exhortation
to prosecutors to seek "justice.,,88 No disciplinary rule promulgated by the
American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1970 explicitly addressed a prosecutor's
obligation to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.
In 1983, the general principles articulated in Model Code Ee 7-13 were given
slightly more substance by Rule 3.8 of the ABA's new Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Rules"). Model Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibili-
A conscientious prosecutor has as much responsibility for protecting against
unfounded convictions as he does in pursuing valid ones. For this reason,
requiring balance and fairness on the part of government lawyers has long been
considered an integral element of professional norms.85
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.86
Simply put, a prosecutor's duty is to seek justice, not convictions. Yet, to date,
ethical rules aimed at prosecutorial fairness have not adequately addressed the
particular problems posed by a prosecutor's presentation of evidence to the grand
JUry.
Reasons for imposing a general duty of fairness on prosecutors were articu-
lated in the American Bar Association's 1970 Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Model Code"):
89. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer RULE 3.8(c)(d) (1984) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
90. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8(a) (1984).
91. An extreme example may illustrate the point. Even in a situation where the prosecutor is presenting
evidence to a grand jury tending to establish that "A" committed a particular crime, and two days prior to
indictment "B" walks in to the prosecutor's office and confesses to the crime, the prosecutor still does not
"know" that "B" committed the crime. for "B" may be confessing falsely. The prosecutor certainly does not
"know" that the grandjury would believe "B" over other witnesses or evidence which points to "A".
92. This construction is supported by several state variations on Model Rule 3.8, and commentary thereto.
See, e.g., ARK. R. PROF. CONOver 3.8. cmt. ("the issuance of a grand jury indictment ordinarily indicates
probable cause for the prosecutor to proceed."); TExAs R. PROF. REsp. 3.09, cmt. 2 ("Paragraph (a) does not
apply to situations where the prosecutor is using a grand jury to determine whether any crime has been
committed, nor does it prevent a prosecutor from presenting a matter to a grand jury even though he has some
doubt as to what charge, if any, the grand jury may decide is appropriate. as long as he believes that the grand
jury could reasonably conclude that some charge is proper.").
ties of a Prosecutor," contains several prescriptions aimed specifically at govern-
ment lawyers in criminal cases. These include the requirements that a prosecutor
make timely pre-trial disclosure of exculpatory Brady material and that the
prosecutor refrain from seeking waiver of procedural rights from an unrepre-
sented accused.89 The comment to Model Rule 3.8 reiterates that these duties are
part of a prosecutor's general responsibility to be a "minister of justice" and not
simply an advocate - thereby repeating the general exhortation for fairness
articulated earlier by the ABA in both its 1908 Canons and its 1970 Model Code.
While Model Rule 3.8 does not directly address a prosecutor's obligation to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, it does require a prosecutor to
"refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause.,,90 Yet this rule does not curtail prosecutorial discretion in the
decision as to what evidence to present to a grand jury. First, the use of the phrase
"refrain from prosecuting" suggests a focus on the continued pursuit of a
criminal matter after indictment, not on the grand jury sdecision to indict and the
evidence offered by the prosecutor to influence this decision. Second, the phrase
"the prosecutor knows" suggests a focus on the prosecutor's subjective knowl-
edge or his assessment of the credibility of the evidence, rather than a grand
juror's potential assessment of that same evidence. For example, to be in
violation of Model Rule 3.8, even if it applied to a prosecutor's decision of what
evidence to submit to a grand jury, the prosecutor would have to "know" that the
existence of this evidence would negate probable cause in the eyes of the grand
jury; that is, without this evidence, that the grand jury would fail to indict. Such
affirmative knowledge is impossible as an epistemological matter, and extremely
unlikely as a practical matter.91 Thus, the plain language of Model Rule 3.8
suggests that it was not intended to apply to grand jury proceedings at a11,92 but
rather to criminal matters commenced by arrest and criminal complaint, such as
those prosecuted in most state courts. There, for example, it would be improper
for a prosecutor to fail to dismiss a charge instituted by a police officer once he
analyzed the police reports and learned that there was insufficient evidence to
satisfy an essential element of the offense,
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1.
93. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3(d).
94. Jill M. Dennis, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The Origins and Applications ofModel Rule
3.3(dJ, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157, 169 (1994).
95. The drafters of Model Rule 3.3 clearly had civil proceedings foremost in their minds in drafting section
(d). In the comment, they used the example of "an application for a temporary restraining order" as an instance
where a party has a limited obligation of presenting adverse facts. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 15.
96. Dennis, supra note 94, at 179.
97. An ex parte proceeding is one conducted by or on behalf ofone party only. "Ajudicial proceeding, order,
injunction, etc. is said to be ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party
only, and without notice to. or contestation by, any person adversely interested." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517
(5th ed. 1979). See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974) (terming a grand jury
proceeding an "ex parte investigation").
98. MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmt. 15.
99. [d.
100. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr ANNOTATED Rule 3.3 (suggesting that term "tribunal,"
though not defined by Model Rule 3.3 nor the comment thereto, applies to courts of law and other adjudicative
hearings).
Some commentators on the Model Rules have looked to Model Rule 3.3 as a
source of authority for imposing upon prosecutors an affirmative obligation to
present substantially exculpatory evidence to a grand jury. Model Rule 3.3(d),
dealing with an attorney's obligations of candor to the tribunal, states: "In an ex
parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to
the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether
or not the facts are adverse.,,93 Model Rule 3.3(d) has no basis or cognate in
either the 1908 Canons or the Model Code. It has been argued that there were
three external sources for imposing this ethical obligation of disclosure in ex
parte proceedings: state common law relating to an attorney's obligations in
moving for a default judgment; rules of civil procedure relating to temporary
restraining orders; and the rules of the United States Patent ,Office.94 All are
uniquely civil, and have no obvious application to criminal proceedings.95
The ABA has yet to construe Model Rule 3.3(d) in either a formal or informal
opinion.96 However, two aspects of the commentary to Model Rule 3.3(d) suggest
that the drafters did not intend it to apply to grand jury proceedings, notwithstand-
ing that such proceedings may be considered ex parte.97 First, the comments
discuss an advocate's duty in ex parte proceedings to present certain adverse
information necessary to "yield a substantially just result" when the conflicting
position would normally "be expected to be presented by the opposing party. ,,98
A putative defendant is not a "party" to the grand jury's investigation, because
the litigation contemplated by a prospective indictment has not yet commenced;
thus, at least one purported justification for the rule does not apply in the grand
jury context. Second, the comment gives as one reason for the rule that, although
the adverse party is not present or formally represented at ex parte proceedings,
"[t]he judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just
consideration.,,99 This statement suggests that the "tribunal" to whom the
obligation of disclosure applies is a judicial tribunal, not a grand jury.100
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The issue of whether Model Rule 3.3(d) applies in the grand jury context is
clouded somewhat by the comments to an entirely different section of the Model
Rules. The comment to Model Rule 3.8, discussing a prosecutor's responsibility
as a "minister ofjustice," states baldly and without elaboration, "[slee also Rule
3.3(d), governing ex parte proceedings, among which grand jury proceedings are
included."lOi Thus, as just discussed, although Model Rule 3.3(d) does not
explicitly state that it applies to grand jury proceedings, and although the
comments to that rule arguably suggest otherwise, the comment to Model Rule
3.8 states that it does. This ambiguity has engendered substantial debate by state
courts in their consideration and adoption of the Model Rules. Several states,
including Massachusetts, have excluded the grand jury from an attorney's
obligation of disclosure in ex parte proceedings, either by explicitly excluding the
grand jury from the definition of ex parte proceedings covered by the rule,102 or
by deleting reference to the grand jury in the comments,103 or both. 104 Neverthe-
less, twenty-one of the thirty-eight states that have adopted some form of the
Model Rules simply have retained, without elaboration, the ABA's curious and
misplaced reference to the grand jury in their comments to Rule 3.8.105 This
101. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8 cmt. l.
102. See ALA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1999) ("In an ex parte proceeding other than a
grand jury proceeding"); HAW. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1994) ("In an ex parte
proceeding except grand jury proceedings and applications for search warrants"); MASS. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) Cmt. 15 (1997) ("Rule 3.3 does not change the rules applicable in situations
covered by specific substantive law, such as presentation of evidence to grand juries"); S.D. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1999) ("In an ex parte proceeding, except grand juries and applications for
search warrants").
103. See TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.09 cmt. 2 (1998) ("Paragraph (a) does
not apply to situations where the prosecutor is using a grand jury to determine whether any crime has been
committed").
104. See MAss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.8 and 3.3(d). In 1996, a Rules Committee
appointed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts proposed adopting the Model Rules ofProfessional
Conduct, and proposed retaining the reference to the grand jury in Comment 1 to Model Rule 3.8. The Rules
Committee's report was released for public comment, and both the Attorney General of Massachusetts and the
United States Attorney for the District of Massachusetts filed letters in opposition. On June 9, 1997 the Supreme
Judicial Court, which had since 1972 followed the Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility, issued its final
order adopting, with some modifications, the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Among these modifications
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deleted reference to the grand jury in comments to its version of
Model Rule 3.8 and excluded the grand jury from the definition of ex parte proceedings covered by its version of
Model Rule 3.3(d). MAss. RULES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Rule 3:07 (1998).
105. See ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998); CONNECTICUT RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1996); DEL. LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt
(1998); FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.8 cmt. (1997); IND. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer
Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998); :£<AN. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997); Ky. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 emt. (1998); MD. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1999);
MICH. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998); Miss. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.8 cmt. (1997); Mo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-3.8 cmt. (1995); N.H. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1995); N.M. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16--308 emt. (1998); OKLA. RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1997); PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998);
S.c. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998); TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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CONDuer Rule 3.09 cmt. (1998); UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 3.8 cmt.(1998); VA. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998); WIS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS Rule
20:3.8 cmt. (1995); WYo. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer FOR ArroRNEYs AT LAW Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998).
106. See United States v. Colorado Sup. Ct., 87 F.3d II61, II65 (10th Cir. 1996) (ruling that United States
Attorney had standing to challenge Colo. Rule 3.3 as a violation of the supremacy clause, because challenge to
rule requiring prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury presented allegation of injury in
fact). Subsequent to this decision. the Colorado Supreme Court deleted from its comment to Rule 3.8 reference
to grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Colorado Sup. Ct., 988 F. Supp. 1368, 1369 (D. Colo. 1998).
107. See Fred C. Zacharias. Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice? 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, II3 (1991). Professor zacharias argues that the Model Rules contain too
generalized an approach to prosecutorial ethics, and that by using amorphous "justice" concepts, the code
drafters have "abdicate[d] their responsibility to write meaningful rules." Id.
108. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Ct., 53 F.3d 1349, 1360 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that a
federal court's power to dismiss an indictment is reserved for "extremely limited circumstances," as doing so
"directly encroaches upon the fundamental role of the grand jury").
109. See. e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1993) (questioning prudence of
remedying ethical violation through dismissal of indictment, and reversing trial court's dismissal of indictment
for interference with defendant's right to counsel in violation of Califomia"no contact" rule).
110. MODEL RULES scope.
111. A collateral consequence of the Williams decision is that federal grand jury transcripts are more likely to
remain exclusively in the prosecutor's possession. FED. R. CRIM P. 6(e)(3)(c)(ii) allows a defendant access to
grand jury transcripts "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of
matters occurring before the grand jury." Yet in Williams, the Supreme Court dramatically limited the available
legal grounds for bringing such pre-trial motions to dismiss. Bernstein, supra note 4, at 571-72.
112. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(c)(ii); United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418. 425 (1983). See also
further fuels the as-yet-unresolved debate as to whether an attorney's disclosure
obligation in ex parte proceedings applies in grand jury presentations.106
As may be seen from this discussion, the above-described rules of professional
responsibility pertaining to a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities before the
grand jury are anything but clear. 107 Even if they were, they would not be an
adequate check on a prosecutor's exercise of discretion. First, courts are unwill-
ing to dismiss an indictment in response to a prosecutor's violation of an ethical
rule before the grand jury, reserving that ultimate sanction for instances in which
a prosecutor either has deprived the defendant of important statutory or constitu-
tional rights,108 or has substantially prejudiced the defendant through some
egregious and flagrant ethical transgression that corrupts the judicial proceed-
ingS.109 The drafters of the Model Rules expressly stated that the ethical rules
were intended to be enforced through bar discipline proceedings, and that
"[v]iolation of a Rule should not ... create any presumption that a legal duty has
been breached." 110 Without the sanction of dismissal, there is little "bite" in the
rules of professional conduct, and thus little incentive for prosecutors to tailor
their conduct to accord with professional norms.
Second, state bar enforcement of any ethical rule requiring a prosecutor to
disclose substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would be extremely
problematic due to the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. III Transcripts of grand
jury proceedings may not be turned over to bar counsel except upon leave of
court after a showing of particularized need. 112 Defense counsel, whose primary
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Frank O. Bowman, Ill, A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The Misuse of "Ethical Rules"Against Prosecutors to
Control the Law ofthe State, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 665, 683 (1996).
113. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger,
65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 734 (1987) (concluding that relying on defense counsel to refer prosecutors to state
disciplinary boards for violations of pre-trial disclosure obligations is ineffective).
114. ld. at 730-31. In a survey of forty-one states which analyzed disciplinary sanctions for Brady violations,
Professor Rosen found that, during a seven year period, only six formal complaints were opened against
prosecutors for failing to fulfill their pre-trial discovery obligations, and in only two cases were informal
sanctions issued. [d. Because Brady violations directly impede a defendant's ability to mount a defense at trial,
one may assume that violations of a prosecutor's grand jury disclosure obligations, if applicable, would be
treated even more leniently by state bar disciplinary boards.
U5. See STEPHEN GILLERS & RoY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 502
(1997).
116. STANDARDS FOR CR1MINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-3.6(b) (Am. BarAss'n 3d ed.
1992).
117. Mitigating factors are simply extenuating circumstances; that is. factors which do not excuse the
conduct, but point towards mercy for the defendant. See Peek v. Kemp, 784 F.2d 1479, 1490 (Uth Cir. 1986).
For Eighth Amendment purposes, the Supreme Court has defined mitigating circumstances in the context of
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interest is in vindicating his client on criminal charges at trial, generally does not
have even minimally sufficient incentives to pursue judicial leave to disclose
grand jury minutes to an administrative enforcement agency. 113
Finally, state bar disciplinary rules can be an effective deterrent to prosecuto-
rial misconduct only if they are applied with enough regularity and severity to
deter prosecutors from omitting substantial exculpatory evidence in their grand
jury presentations. Even if state bar overseers possessed the tools necessary to
enforce a clearly defined ethical rule pertaining to grand jury disclosure, bar
discipline is too erratic and uncertain, and the imposition of sanctions by the
courts following disciplinary recommendations too uneven, to serve as an
adequate incentive for prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury.114 When issues ofprofessional conduct are closely intertwined with substan-
tive legal directives - in this case, Fifth Amendment protections - state bar
disciplinary organizations simply are reluctant to become involved.
While efforts at rule making and enforcement have not adequately addressed '
the issue, the ABA has attempted to provide some ethical guidance to prosecutors
in the form of non-binding standards of conduct. The ABA Standards Relating to
the Administration of Criminal Justice ("Standards"), approved in 1973, are
intended to present "guidelines that have long been adhered to by the best
prosecutors and best defense advocates." 115 They are aspirational standards only,
and not disciplinary rules.
The Standards contain an important admonition pertaining to a prosecutor's
ethical responsibilities before the grand jury. Standard 3-3.6(b), pertaining to the
prosecution function, provides that "[n]o prosecutor should knowingly fail to'
disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or mitigate the ..
offense." 116 "Mitigating" evidence is substantially broader than "exculpatory"
evidence. 117 If taken seriously, this standard would suggest that prosecutors
IV. STATE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM
State courts and legislatures have not blindly followed the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Williams by taking a "hands off" approach to this problem. Of the
states that have addressed the issue by statute or common law, most have
determined that prosecutors do have some limited and enforceable duty to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. However, they differ on how the
.,:;
,
,i
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requisite jury instructions in the penalty phase of death penalty cases as "any aspect of a defendant's character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). Examples include aspects of the defendant's
background which explain his conduct; mental impairment not rising to the level of a complete defense to the
crime; intoxication or drug use; and, relevant aspects of the victim's character or conduct that suggest that the
victim may have initiated or provoked the defendant's conduct. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (1996) (setting forth
permissible mitigating factors for jury to consider in sentencing phase of death penalty cases).
118. The United States Attorneys' Manual, while expressly disavowing the creation of legal rights for
defendants, serves as an internal ethical code for federal prosecutors. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 11,
at 1-1.100. See also United States v. Blackley, 167 F.3d 543,548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)(internalDOJ standards to not
confer substantive rights upon criminal defendants). However, it does require federal prosecutors who are
"personally aware of substantial evidence that directly negates the guilt of a subject to the investigation ... [to]
present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a
person." U.S. ArroRNEYs' MANuAL, supra note 11, at 9-11.233.
119. The NDAA manual is intended as a "reference source on the prosecution function. " NATIONAL DISTRICT
ATIORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1 (1991). Its relevant provision suggests that
"[t]he prosecutor should disclose to the grand jury any evidence which he knows will tend to negate guilt or
preclude an indictment." Id. Standard 58.4, at 173.
should disclose to the grand jury even evidence that might affect the degree of
punishment which a defendant should receive after trial. Such a broad standard
finds no support in the case law, and seems entirely inconsistent with the
traditional charging and screening function of the grand jury.
Standard 3-3.6(b) is echoed to varying degrees both in the United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) United States Attorneys' Manual118 and in the
National District Attorney's Association ("NDAA") National Prosecution Stan-
dards119 - non-binding internal codes of conduct for federal and state prosecu-
tors, respectively. However, both the United States Attorneys' Manual and the
National Prosecution Standards employ language significantly narrower than the
, Standard 3-3.6(b) in their definition of substantially exculpatory evidence.
Neither the federal nor state prosecutors' manuals include the ABA's unusual
reference to mitigating information. Moreover, the United States Attorneys'
Manual requires disclosure to the grand jury only of evidence which directly
; negates guilt, not evidence which "tends" to negate guilt. For reasons that
discussed in Section V, infra, the United States Attorneys' Manual offers a far
more balanced and practical statement of a prosecutor's ethical responsibilities in
this area than either the National Prosecution Standards or Standard 3-3.36(b).
A. ALLOWING A DEFENDANT TO APPEAR
duty is satisfied and the appropriate remedy for a breach. Only a minority of state
courts have agreed with the United States Supreme Court that prosecutors have
no enforceable duty whatsoever to present exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. 120
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Several states have enacted statutes which allow the target of a grand jury
investigation to appear before the grand jury and either make a personal
statement or give evidence on his own behalf. Although not expressly tied to
exculpatory evidence per se, the practical significance of these statutes is that
they allow the putative defendant the chance to avoid indictment altogether or
reduce the potential charges against him if he is in possession of credible
exculpatory evidence which would explain away or mitigate the offense.
Nevada, New York, New Mexico, and Georgia each have departed from the
federal rule l21 via statutes allowing the target of a grand jury investigation to
appear and give evidence on his own behalf. These statutes differ from one
another in several respects. Nevada and New Mexico require the prosecutor to
notify the putative defendant of his target status and his right to appear. 122 New
York, however, without providing notice, puts the onus on the target to request an
appearance. 123 Georgia limits the category of cases in which the target has a right
to appear to public corruption offenses. 124
120. Sharon N. Humble. Annotation, Duty ofProsecutor to Present Exculpatory Evidence to State Grand
Jury, 49 A.L.R. 5th 639, 656-57 (1997). See, e.g., People v. Beu, 644 N.E.2d 27,30 (TIL App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury); State v. Easter, 661 S.W.2d 644, "
645 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (same); State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 127 (R.I. 1983) (same).
121. Targets of federal grand jury investigations have no absolute right to appear before the grand jury.
United States v. Fritz, 852 F,2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988). While the United States Attorneys'Manual cautions
federal prosecutors to give "favorable consideration" to all "reasonable requests" by targets to appear before
the grand jury, it does not require them to allow such an appearance. U.S. AITORNEYs' MANUAL, supra note 11,
at 9--11.152. Considerations which may affect the reasonableness of a request include the likelihood or
consequences of delay, whether the target is represented, and the target's willingness to waive, in writing, his
right against self-incrimination and to consent to full cross-examination. ld.
122. See NEV. REv. STAT. § 172.241 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(B) (1978). In a situation where the
grand jury is investigating a crime which has not been charged in a lower court, providing the target with notice
of his right to appear could compromise the secrecy and efficacy of the investigation by allowing the putative
defendant to flee the jurisdiction, secrete evidence, or tamper with witnesses. Nevada allows the prosecutor to
apply ex parte to the court supervising the grand jury for permission to withhold notice, if the prosecutor
presents adequate cause to believe that the person under investigation is a flight risk or may pose a danger to the
life or property of other persons. NEV. REv. STAT. § 172.241(3)(a). New Mexico allows the prosecutor himselfto
waive the notice requirement, in situations where "the prosecutor determines" that there is a risk of flight,
danger to other persons, or potential obstruction of justice. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11 (B).
123. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 19O.50(5)(a) (Consol. 1996). New York requires the prosecutor to give the
target notice of his statutory right to appear only in cases where the defendant has already been arraigned on a
pending felony charge in local criminal court, and the underlying charge is the same offense which is the subject
of the pending grand jury proceeding. ld.
124. See GA. CODE ANN. § 45-11-4 (1997).
B. BROAD DUTY TO DISCLOSE
125. NEV. REv. STAT. § 172.145(2).
126. Ostman v. Nevada, 816 P.2d 458 (Nev. 1991) (holding that where issue in rape investigation was one of
consent, and victim was defendant's girlfriend, district attorney violated statute by failing to inform grand jury
of defendant's voluntary statement to police after incident in question that the victim had voluntarily
participated in sexual activity).
127. Sheriff v. Frank, 734 P.2d 1241,1244 (Nev. 1987) (ruling that where victim of alleged sexual abuse had
initially alleged abuse both by her father and brother, and later recanted allegation against brother, it was error
for prosecutor to fail to inform grand jury about recantation, because it could have been considered by grand
jury as prior false statement in assessing victim's credibility).
128. Ostrruln, 816 P.2d at 459 (quoting Frank, 734 P.2d at 1244).
129. [d. at 460.
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For at least two reasons, these types of statutes are insufficient to ensure a more
balanced presentation of evidence before the grand jury. First, the defendant who
chooses to appear before the grand jury waives his right against self incrimina-
tion, exposes himself to cross examination by the prosecutor, and risks future use
of his statements against him at trial. For this reason alone, many, if not most,
seasoned defense lawyers would advise targets of grand jury investigations not to
testify before the grand jury, even if the target were in possession of exculpatory
evidence and wanted to "tell his side of the story. " This is particularly so in states
that do not allow counsel for the witness to appear with his client in the grand jury
room. Second, these "right to appear" statutes do not capture a host of situations
where there is substantial exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor but not
to the defendant - such as the results of forensic examinations, recantation by
material witnesses, or misidentification. In such circumstances, allowing the defendant
the right to appear does not address fully the problem presented by a prosecutor
who willfully withholds from the grand jury substantial exculpatory evidence.
A number of states have enacted statutes that, either expressly or by interpreta-
tion, require a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. For
i example, a Nevada statute provides that "[i]f the district attorney is aware of any
evidence which will explain away the charge, he shall submit it to the grand
jury." 125 The Supreme Court of Nevada has interpreted this "explain away the
charge" language extremely broadly, dismissing indictments without prejudice to
re-indictment where, for example, the prosecutor fails to present to the grand jury
the target's general denials made to police126 or prior bad act evidence which
arguably impeaches the alleged victim. 127 The Nevada court has considered it
necessary to vigorously and expansively enforce this statute in order to preserve
the independence of the grand jury, reasoning that "a prosecutor's refusal to
present exculpatory evidence 'destroys the existence of an independent and
informed grand jury.' ,,128 Dissenting Nevada justices have accused the majority
of adopting an "unnecessarily expansive view of the meaning of exculpatory
evidence that may add an unwarranted dimension to grand jury proceedings. ,,129
C. LIMITED DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Even in the absence of a controlling statute, some states have taken action in
this area by judicial decision. 139 New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts are
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California also has imposed a broad duty of disclosure upon prosecutors. In ..
Johnson v. Superior Court,130 the attorney prosecuting a narcotics case did not
present to the grand jury the defendant's testimony from an earlier probable cause
hearing that he was selling amphetamines on the day of his arrest at the direction
of law enforcement officials with the intention of informing on the buyers.131 The
court ruled that the district attorney's failure to bring this testimony to the
attention of the grand jury violated California Penal Code (939.7 which autho-
rizes a grand jury to subpoena and consider evidence "when it has reason to
believe that [such] other evidence within their reach will explain away the
charge." 132 Stating that "[t]he grand jury cannot be expected to call for evidence
of which it is kept ignorant,"133 the court ruled that the grand jury's statutory
right to consider such evidence would be illusory unless the district attorney also
had an implied duty under the statute to inform the grand jury when he is
personally aware of "evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt." 134 The court
issued a writ prohibiting trial of the defendant and directing that the charge be
dismissed without prejudice to the state's right to seek another indictment,135
Subsequent California cases suggest that Johnson requires prosecutors to dis-
close to the grand jury evidence that, if believed, would affect the degree of crime
charged136 or undermine the credibility of a key state witness, 137 but not evidence
of legal insanity. 138
130. 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975).
131. After hearing this evidence and crediting it, the magistrate found no probable cause to hold the
defendant for trial. [d. at 793.
132. CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1985).
133. Johnson, 539 P.2d at 794.
134. [d. at 796.
135. [d.
136. Page v. Superior Ct., 153 Cal. Rptr. 730, 737 (Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1979) (vacating murder indictment
with special circumstance (kidnapping) because prosecutor failed to disclose to grand jury the statement of
witness tending to negate kidnapping charge by suggesting that victim left with defendant voluntarily),
137, Page, 153 Cal Rptr. at 735 (finding that prosecutor had minimally fulfilled duty to inform grand jury of '
matters relating to the "credibility ofa material witness" where circumstances relating to witness's involvement'
in narcotics were generally made known to grand jury).
138. People v. Snow, 140 Cal. Rptr.427, 432-33 (Cal. App. 3d Supp., 1977) (evidence oflegal insanity is not
exculpatory evidence within Johnson holding, because in California insanity is not considered to negate guilt,
but only to affect sentencing at the second, bifurcated stage of "guilty but insane" proceeding).
139. State high courts certainly are not constrained from fashioning rules supervising prosecutorial
misconduct in the grand jury by the Supreme Court's questionable separation of powers reasoning in Williams;
that is, state courts may view state constitutional guarantees of indictment by grand jury as implicitly requiring
disclosure by prosecutors to render this right meaningful, or they may fashion a disclosure rule based upon their
view of the appropriate supervisory role of their courts over state grand jury matters.
140. People v. Filis, 386 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
141. See People v. Lancaster, 503 N.E.2d 990, 993 (N.Y. 1986) (citing People v. Pelchat, 464 N.E.2d 447
(N.Y. 1984».
142. ld.
143. People v. Mitchell, 626 N.E.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. 1993) (prosecutor introduced statement made by
defendant upon 911 response that she stabbed husband "because he was cheating on me," but did not introduce
subsequent, post-arrest statement at police station that she acted in self-defense). This result is explained by the
fact that New York has a statute allowing a defendant to appear and testify before the grand jury. N.Y. 'CRIM.
PRoc. LAW 190.50(5)(a). There is little justification for requiring a prosecutor to introduce before the grand jury
an unsworn, out of court exculpatory statement by the defendant, when the defendant has a right, if he so
chooses, to appear before the grand jury and make the same statement under oath.
144. People v. Brewster, 472 N.E.2d 686,687 (N.Y. 1984).
145. Compare Filis, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 990 (refusing to dismiss murder indictment where prosecutor failed to
inform grand jury that witness who testified that specific men had killed her husband had earlier given statement
to police suggesting her inability to identify the men), with People v. Monroe, 480 N.Y.S.2d 259,267 (Sup. Ct.
1984) (dismissing rape indictment where witness who made positive identification before grand jury had earlier
made an undisclosed equivocal identification at lineup).
good examples of jurisdictions that have imposed a more limited duty of
disclosure upon prosecutors in the grand jury by common law. The high courts of
these states have struck a balance between full disclosure, which risks turning
grand jury .proceedings into mini-trials on the merits and severely taxing the
resources of reviewing courts, and no duty of disclosure whatsoever, which limits
the ability of the grand jury to perform a meaningful screening function. These
jurisdictions have ruled that a prosecutor must disclose to the grand jury only that
exculpatory evidence which is so "substantial" or "important" that it might
reasonably have tended to affect the grand jury's decision to indict.
Since 1976, New York courts have recognized a duty on the part of prosecutors
to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.14O Although not
resting this duty on state constitutional grounds, the New York Court of Appeals
has likened a prosecutor's obligation of disclosure in the grand jury to a
prosecutor's obligation under the Due Process Clause not to obtain a conviction
based on evidence he knows to be false or perjured.141 Suggesting that omitting
exculpatory evidence is like lying to the tribunal, the court of appeals stated that
"as a public officer [the prosecutor] owes a duty of fair dealing to the accused and
candor to the courts." 142
The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that exculpatory out of court
communications by the target need not be introduced before the grand jury unless
they are part of a single statement with both inculpatory and exculpatory
elements and the prosecutor intends to present the inculpatory section to the
grand jury.143 The court has also ruled that when a witness before the grand jury
testifies that she previously identified the defendant as the robber, the prosecutor
need not notify the grand jury that the identification was made from a photograph
rather than in person. l44 The New York trial courts' record of enforcing this
limited disclosure obligation with regard to impeachment material has been
uneven, leading to inconsistent results. 145
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146. Lancaster, 503 N.E.2d at 995.
147. ld. at 993-94 (distinguishing between exculpatory defenses and mitigating defenses).
148. N.¥. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (Consol. 1998).
149. N.¥. CRIM. PRoc. LAw §§ 330.10(2), 330.20 (Conso!. 1996).
150. Lancaster, 503 N.E.2d at 995.
151. State v. Hogan, 676 A.2d 533, 543 (N.J. 1996) (declining to dismiss indictment where prosecutor did
not infonn grand jury that armed robbery victim had recanted and then subsequently rescinded her recantation,
"partly because recantations are often induced by duress or coercion, the sincerity of a recantation is to be
viewed with extreme suspicion") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
152. ld.
153. ld. at 543--44.
154. Id.
The New York Court ofAppeals has also ruled that the prosecutor has no duty
to introduce to the grand jury evidence of the target's psychiatric history that
would support an insanity"defense.146 The court reasoned that a prosecutor is not
required to present to the grand jury every conceivable defense that would be
suggested by the evidence, but only those "complete" defenses which, if
believed, would eliminate a "needless or unfounded prosecution." 147 Although
the defense of mental disease or defect may be considered a complete defense in
New York because it relieves the defendant of criminal responsibility for his
crime,I48 it also subjects the defendant to detention in a psychiatric institution at
the conclusion of the trial.149 The court of appeals was unwilling to require
prosecutors to introduce evidence of mental disease or defect to the grand jury
because it would implicitly accord the grand jury the latitude to return a "no bill"
upon the successful assertion of the defense, thereby frustrating the intent of the
legislature to allow civil commitment of defendants found not guilty by reason of
insanity. 150
The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that a prosecutor has an obligation to
disclose to the grand jury evidence which is both clearly exculpatory and directly
negates the guilt of the accused. I51 The New Jersey high court cautioned that it
would interpret the second part of this test - "directly negates guilt" - very
narrowly: to warrant dismissal of the indictment the omitted evidence must
"squarely refut[e] an element of the crime in question." 152 In its 1996 opinion
announcing this new rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that its
limited duty of disclosure will be triggered only in "a rare case," and went on to
describe a number of forms of exculpatory evidence which in its view clearly are
not so important as to squarely refute the state's case and directly negate guilt-
such as prior inconsistent statements of a grand jury witness; prior criminal
records of a grand jury witness; evidence that the accused lacked a motive for the
crime; and, self-serving exculpatory statements made by the accused.153 The
New Jersey court left open the possibility that evidence of bias on the part of a"
crucial witness may require disclosure "in the context of the nature and source of
the evidence," and that a "reliable, unbiased alibi witness" may in certain
circumstances also mandate disclosure. 154
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155. 467 N.E.2d 1340, 1351 (Mass. 1984).
156. Id. at 1352. The witness testified in the grand jury that one of two co-defendants had paid him to register
a car used to dispose of the victims' bodies. Id. at 1351. The prosecutor failed to bring to the grand jury's
attention that this same witness had previously identified at a probable cause hearing the other co-defendant as
the person who had paid him the money. Id. The court ruled that the grand jury was made minimally aware of
this important inconsistency, by the witness' statement to the grand jury that "in the past I have said it was
Tommy." Id. at 1352.
157. See Commonwealth v. McGahee, 473 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1985) (prosecutor failed to notify
grand jury that witness who saw alleged perpetrator of armed robbery run from variety store failed to identify
defendant at line up); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 541 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (in prosecution for
aggravated rape where defendant had allegedly met the victim in a bar and offered her a ride home, the
prosecutor failed to inform grand jury of rape victim's prior inconsistent statement to an Emergency Medical
Technician (EMT) that she had been assaulted by someone who had picked her up "hitchhiking"); Common-
wealth v. Petras, 529 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988) (in rape case, prosecutor failed to inform grandjury
about victim's statement to medical personnel at hospital suggesting lack of penetration); Commonwealth v.
Pond. 510 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (prosecutor failed to inform grand jury that victim was
uncertain in her testimony against defendant); Commonwealth v. Pace, 491 N.E.2d 1080, 1082 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986) (prosecutor failed to notify grand jury that rape victim had picked a picture of someone other than
defendant out of photo array); Commonwealth v. McGuire, 476 N.E.2d 632, 633 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(prosecutor failed to inform grand jury that victim of armed robbery, who had identified the defendant to the
police in person minutes after the street incident, had failed to pick the defendant out of a line up five weeks
later).
158. McGahee. 473 N.E.2d at 1080.
159. See Commonwealth v. Buckley, 571 N.E.2d 609, 616 (Mass. 1991) (finding that "the grand jury heard
In Massachusetts, an indictment also may be dismissed due to defects in the
grand jury presentation if the prosecutor withholds important exculpatory evi-
dence from the grand jury. In the 1984 decision of Commonwealth v. Connor, the
Supreme Judicial Court articulated the general rule that: "If the grand jury were
not made aware of circumstances which undermine the credibility of evidence
that is likely to have affected their decision to indict, then the appropriate remedy
may be dismissal of the indictment."155 Yet, in the Connor case, the court
concluded that the indictments need not be dismissed because the prosecutor
"minimally fulfilled" his duty to alert the grand jury to a prior inconsistent
statement by a key prosecution witness.156
In the fourteen years since Connor, although the Massachusetts appellate
courts have paid lip service to their power to dismiss an indictment in response to
a prosecutor's failure to present substantial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury,
they have never exercised the power, even though several compelling instances
ofprosecutorial misfeasance have been presented to them.157 Repeatedly proclaim-
ing that "prosecutors are not required in every instance to reveal all exculpatory
evidence to a grand jury," 158 these cases typically conclude that the evidence
allegedly withheld was simply not important enough to have affected the grand
jury's decision. In some instances, the Massachusetts courts have looked at the
sufficiency of the other evidence presented to the grand jury in making this
materiality detennination, ruling that even had the grand jury considered the
withheld and allegedly exculpatory evidence, there existed sufficient other
evidence to meet the standard of probable cause. 159 Furthermore, in instances
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sufficient evidence to establish probable cause with respect to Buckley's involvement in the murder" even
though prosecutor failed to introduce evidence of another man at murder scene wearing a maroon hat);
Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 477 N.E.2d 158, 165 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (finding "sufficient other evidence
before the grand jury ... establish(ing] that the fire had been set" where prosecutor failed to alert grand jury to
test on carpet sample which was inconclusive as to the presence of gasoline residue in arson case). Unlike
federal law, this focus on the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury is permitted under Massachusetts
law. While not expressly declining to follow the Supreme Court's ruling in Costello. the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has ruled that a court reviewing an indictment must minimally assure itself that the grand jury
heard "sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the accused and probable cause to arrest him."
Conunonwealth v. McCarthy, 430 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Mass. 1982). Massachusetts thus is among a small
number ofjurisdictions, including New York, which allow the trial court to review the sufficiency of evidence
before a grand jury. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.5.5(c) (2d ed. 1992). See
also N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 190.65 (Conso!. 1992).
160. Commonwealth v. Trowbridge. 647 N.E.2d 413, 417-l8 (Mass. 1995); McGuire, 476 N.E.2d at 633.
where the issue presented itself on direct review of a conviction following trial,
the Massachusetts courts have on occasion reasoned that because the exculpatory
evidence was made known to the trial jury and yet did not dissuade them from
convicting the defendant, it would not likely have had any significant effect on
the grand jury which indicted the defendant. 160
The experience of states such as Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey
highlights the flaws inherent in the "substantial exculpatory evidence" approach.
Application of this standard requires the court reviewing the indictment to
determine whether the withheld evidence, had it been introduced to the grand
jury, would have likely made a difference in their decision to indict. This
obviously requires the court to speculate as to what would have influenced the
twenty-three lay citizens without having any actual knowledge of the contents of
their deliberations.
A single example will serve to illustrate the practical difficulties of this
substituted judgment of materiality. Assume that a government lawyer fails to
alert the grand jury to evidence that a government witness (a co-conspirator) has
been offered leniency in exchange for cooperation. A trial court reviewing this
omission on a motion to dismiss may consider bias a form of substantial
exculpatory evidence, and may dismiss the indictment. However, the grand jury,
in its secret deliberations, may have disbelieved and totally discounted the
co-conspirator's testimony for reasons unrelated to bias (e.g., lack of memory or
lack of credibility), and might nevertheless have chosen to indict the defendant
based on other evidence. In such circumstances, the judge's determination of
what would have affected the grand jury's decision could well be totally
erroneous. Applying this substituted, speculative judgment of materiality might
do nothing to safeguard the independence of a particular grand jury decision, and
might even undercut it.
Because a "substantial exculpatory evidence" test is so heavily dependent
upon not only the particular factual context of each case, but also upon the
subjective viewpoint of the reviewing judge called upon to substitute his view of
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161. 694A.2d 196 (N.J. 1997).
162. Scherzer, 694A,2d at 227.
163. Id.
164. !d. (quoting Hogan. 676 A,2d at 533).
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materiality for that of the grand jury, the outcome of this judicial guesswork
provides little guidance to ethical prosecutors in search of a standard to guide
their conduct. It is not surprising that results in state cases applying a "substantial
exculpatory evidence~' standard vary wildly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
even from court to court within particular jurisdictions. A practitioner reviewing
these decisions in search of a guiding standard is reminded of Goldilocks tasting
the porridge of the three bears in the classic children's story; some evidence is
considered substantial enough to require disclosure, other evidence is considered
insubstantial. While at either end of the spectrum it might be clear what
exculpatory evidence is highly material ("too hot") and what exculpatory
evidence is relatively immaterial ("too cold"), within these two extremes there
are myriad fonns of exculpatory evidence which a prosecutor mayor may not
" choose to present to the grand jury, at his peril.
The difficulties in applying a "substantial exculpatory evidence" standard for
grand jury disclosure are amply demonstrated, for example, by the New Jersey
case of State v. Scherzer. 161 This high profile suburban gang rape case is the
source of the illustration in Section I, infra. In the grand jury, the Scherzer
prosecutor only presented the government experts on the mental defect issue, not
informing the grand jury of the defense experts' testimony, given at a preliminary
hearing, which rebutted the government's experts. Following indictment, the
defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that the prosecution had violated its duty
to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. The superior court
denied the motion, and the defendant was tried and convicted. On appeal, the
New Jersey appellate division, applying the two-part test of State v. Hogan, ruled
that although the omitted evidence "directly negated the accused's guilt" because
it rebutted an essential element of the crime (that the victim was "mentally
defective"), it was "not clearly exculpatory" when viewed in the context of the
nature and source of the evidence.162 With little analysis, the court stated that the
"prosecutor had no obligation to present the grand jury with the testimony of
defense experts thereby requiring the grand jury to make a credibility judg-
ment.,,163 The test for whether the evidence was "clearly exculpatory" was
whether the defense experts' testimony was so powerful or persuasive "as to
induce a rational grand juror to conclude that the State ha[d] not made out a prima
facie case." 164
The Scherzer case illustrates the danger inherent in asking courts to evaluate
the alleged misconduct of prosecutors with reference solely to the importance or
materiality of the exculpatory evidence at issue; such a test always requires the
court to substitute its view of the exculpatory evidence for the grand jury's. In
V. A NEW MODEL
165. See Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial:" When Prosecutors Keep Score ofCriminal Convictions, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 538-40 (1996) (arguing that a prosecutor's attainment of justice cannot and should
not be measured by the results of a verdict).
166. See Arenella, supra note 18, at 508-11.
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Scherzer, the court believed that the prosecution's experts were as credible or
more credible than the defense experts; otherwise, it could not reasonably have
concluded that the omitted evidence was not so "clearly exculpatory" that it
would have induced the grand jury not to indict. Had the grand jury found each of
the prosecutor's experts incredible, and the defense experts credible, there would
have been no probable cause to believe that the defendants committed the crime.
It might be argued that the likelihood of acquittal at trial is a sufficient check on
prosecutors introducing substantial exculpatory evidence before the grand jury,
and that therefore no judicial intervention is necessary. This argument suggests
that if the evidence is of such weight that it will convince a trial jury to return an
acquittal, most rational prosecutors would prefer that the grand jury screen out
the case, rather than have indictment issue and be followed by a prolonged trial
and eventual acquittal. Forces other than normative rules (in this case, a
prosecutor's time spent trying a borderline case and his· ultimate record of
convictions and acquittals) may adequately check a prosecutor's inclination to
withhold important exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. If believed, this
argument suggests that state courts and legislatures should follow the Supreme
Court's lead in Williams and take a "hands off" approach to the problem.
Even if one accepts "fear of losing" as an appropriate deterrent to indicting
weak cases,165 there are at least two flaws with this reasoning. First, only a very
small percentage of indicted cases actually proceed to trial - most are resolved
by plea bargaining. Because a defendant may be induced to plead guilty for
reasons unrelated to factual or legal guilt,l66 there are many instances in which a
prosecutor "wins" even the weakest of cases. Moreover, there are a number of
completely rational, though sometimes unethical, reasons that a prosecutor might
fail to notify the grand jury of exculpatory evidence in his possession, including:
1) the offense is so serious that public outcry is pressuring law enforcement to
"solve" the crime; 2) the defendant has a serious criminal record and presents a
threat to the community, such that indicting on a marginal case would serve the
public interest in pre-trial detention and segregation, even if there is ultimately a
verdict of not guilty; or, 3) the prosecutor is looking to "flip" the defendant and
use the indictment as leverage to gain his cooperation against another target. In
each of these situations, factors collateral to the guilt or innocence of the accused
may induce a prosecutor to push forward with a weak indictment. The system
needs a built-in check to protect against prosecutorial overzealousness.
The Supreme Court's reluctance to impose a duty upon prosecutors to disclose
167. 438 u.s. 154, 155-56 (1978).
168. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Franks sets forth the framework for addressing claims of
false statements in a search warrant affidavit, its holding has been applied to allegations of misstatements in an
arrest warrant affidavit. See United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297,300 (4th Cir. 1990); Dailey v. United States,
611 A.2d 963,965 (D.C. 1992).
169. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
-170. [d. at 171.
171. [d.
172. [d. at 156.
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury reflects pragmatic concerns for the
enforceability of this duty once created. How exculpatory must the evidence be to
mandate disclosure, and how can a court review an indictment without necessar-
ily substituting its view of the evidence for that of the grand jury? Clearly, the
Supreme Court found these questions impenetrable and therefore decided in
Williams to forego the inquiry altogether. Yet those states that have eschewed the
Williams approach and adopted a limited rule of disclosure for "substantial
exculpatory evidence" have fared no better. They have assumed the laborious and
costly task of reviewing grand jury presentations without any assurance that their
conclusions as to which omissions "tend to negate probable cause" or "explain
away the charge" either represents or protects the will of the grand jury. Nor does
such speculation provide any meaningful guidance to prosecutors.
Rather than focusing solely on the materiality of the exculpatory evidence and
its likely impact on the grand jury, a more workable and meaningful standard of
review can be derived from Franks v. Delaware. 167 It focuses on whether the
prosecutor intended to distort the evidence and mislead the grand jury. For over
twenty years, this standard has been applied successfully to omissions by police
officers in search and arrest warrant applications,168 and it would map well to the
topic of exculpatory evidence withheld from the grand jury.
The Supreme Court in Franks established a three-part test for reviewing an
allegation that a search warrant was issued based on a false or misleading
affidavit. To warrant a pre-trial hearing, the defendant must make a substantial
preliminary showing that: 1) the affidavit contains false statements; 2) these false
statements were made knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth; and 3) these false statements were necessary to a finding of probable
cause; that is, without the false statements the affidavit is insufficient to establish
probable cause to se~ch or seize. 169 This showing "must be more than conclu-
sory" and must be accompanied by a detailed offer of proof. 170 "Allegations of
negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. ,,171
If the defendant makes an adequate threshold showing of each of these three
elements, he is entitled under Franks to an evidentiary hearing to test the veracity
of the search warrant affidavit. 172 Where the defendant establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence after an evidentiary hearing that the affidavit was intention-
ally perjurious or that false statements were made with reckless disregard for the
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173. Franks, 438 U.S. at 168 (noting that the constitutional requirement of probable cause "would be reduced
to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause").
174. See United States v. Kyllo, 37 F,3d 526, 529 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Williams, 737 F,2d 594,
604 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Martin, 615 F,2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dennis, 625 F,2d
782,792 (8th Cir. 1980).
175. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 'TREATISE ON TIlE FOURTIIAMENDMENT § 4.4(b) (2d ed.
1987 & Supp. 1995).
176. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,363 (1956).
177. A "distortion" standard has several analogues outside the grand jury context in addition to Franks.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Costello upholding the use of hearsay testimony in the grand jury,
some federal courts began scrutinizing a prosecutor's use of hearsay testimony before the grand jury utilizing a
"distortion" standard, ruling that a prosecutor may not mislead the grand jury into thinking they are getting a
first-hand account of evidence when in fact the witness is not testifying from personal knowledge. See United
States v. Estepa, 471 F,2d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Leibowitz, 420 F,2d 39, 41--42 (2d Cir.
1969). In Massachusetts, a line of cases parallel to the exculpatory evidence cases have recognized a
prosecutor's duty not to distort the presentation before the grand jury. See injrq note 186 and accompanying text.
178. Franks, 438 U.S. at 164.
truth, and that with the false statements set to one side the "remaining content is
insufficient to establish probable cause," the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
require that the fruits of the warrant be suppressed to the same extent as if
probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit entirely. 173
The Franks test for determining when a misstatement in a warrant application
violates the Fourth Amenc4nent protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been applied to omissions in both search and arrest warrant
applications, that is, failure by the law enforcement officer to alert the issuing
magistrate to exculpatory facts. 174 Where a police officer intentionally or reck-
lessly omits from a warrant application exculpatory facts which are material to a
finding of probable cause, courts have interpreted Franks to require suppression
of evidence in certain narrowly defined circumstances. 175
The post-Franks cases dealing with omissions in arrest warrants provide an apt
framework for assessing claims of grand jury misconduct, because both an arrest
warrant and an indictment represent a finding of probable cause that the
defendant committed a particular crime, and both trigger a call to answer to those
charges. Moreover, an indictment, like an arrest warrant, may lead to the
apprehension of the named defendant and a deprivation of his liberty. Finally, a
presumption of validity attaches both to an indictment and to a warrant. 176 For
these reasons, the standards for evaluating when an omission before the grand
jury should result in a dismissal of the charges should be the same as the standard
applied in determining when an omission in the application for an arrest warrant
should result in the suppression of evidence. 177 In both situations, the court
"encounters conflicting values" 178 between the presumed validity of the magis-
trate or grand jury decision on the one hand (and the concomitant desire to avoid
litigating pretrial issues collateral to the guilt or innocence of the accused) and the
need to safeguard the judicial process by deterring perjurious or misleading
presentations of evidence at the probable cause stage.
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When dealing with a factual misstatement in a warrant application, the line
between a negligent misstatement (e.g., a typographical error) and an intentional
misstatement (e.g., misstating the evidence in order to influence the magistrate),
while perhap~difficult to draw in particular cases, is at least understandable. Yet
when dealing with omissions - assuming that the law enforcement officer had
knowledge of the exculpatory fact - every decision not to include a fact in the
warrant application is "intentional." Law enforcement officials routinely collect
more information than they put in search warrant affidavits or present to the grand
jury; a challenge to omissions which treats every intentional and material
omission as cause for recission opens law enforcement to endless conjecture
about which investigative leads they should have pursued and which fragment of
information ultimately might have benefited the target. Omissions are therefore a
problem different from misstatements because not every intentional omission is a
deliberate falsehood. Omissions may be "intentional" but they may also be
reasonable. For example, evidence may be excluded because law enforcement
believes in good faith that it is underdeveloped, extraneous, or cumulative.
For these reasons, courts have struggled with the issue of what constitutes an
intentional omission for purposes of the Franks test. In addressing the issue of
when omissions should be sufficient grounds for suppressing the fruits of a
warrant, some circuits collapsed the "intentionality" and "materiality" prongs of
Franks into a single test, ruling that intent to present the magistrate with a
"deliberate falsehood" can be inferred from the knowing omission of materially
exculpatory evidence. That is, if a police officer knowingly withheld evidence
which was so critical as to negate probable cause, such an omission must have
been an intentional, or deliberate, falsehood. 179
This approach was roundly criticized by the Fourth Circuit in the 1990 case of
United States v. Colkley:
[E]very decision not to include certain infonnation in the affidavit is "inten-
tional" insofar as it is made knowingly. If, as the district court held, this type of
"intentional" omission is all that Franks requires, the Franks intent prerequi-
site would be satisfied in almost every case. Franks clearly requires defendants
to allege more than "intentional" omission in this weak sense. "The mere fact
that the affiant does not list every conceivable conclusion does not taint the
validity of the affidavit." Franks protects against omissions that are designed to
mislead, or that are made in reckless disregard of whether they would mislead
. . . the magistrate. . . . We have doubts about the validity of inferring bad
motive under Franks from the fact of omission alone, for such an inference
collapses into a single inquiry the two elements - "intentionality" and
"materiality" - which Franks states are independently necessary.lS0
2000] TOWARD A MORE INDEPENDENT GRAND JURY 395
I
I
I
t
179. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 328 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that only omissions made
with intentional or reckless disregard for accuracy will undermine the affidavit; negligent omissions alone will
not suffice).
180. 899 F.2d 297,301 (4th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
181. See Lombardi v. EI Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F,3d 1369,
1377 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Reddy, 882 F, Supp. 497, 500 (D. Md. 1995); Dailey v. United States, 611 A.2d
963,966 (D.C. 1992); Johnson v. Florida, 660 So. 2d 648, 656 (Fla. 1995); People v. Reynolds, 420 N.E.2d
1193,1196 (lll. App. 1981); Washington v. Garrison, 827 P.2d 1388,1390 (Wash. 1992).
182. This is not to imply that the federal battle on this issue is necessarily lost after Williams. There may still
be avenues for federal judges to supervise the government's presentation of evidence before the grand jury.
First, intentional distortion of evidence before the grand jury is more akin to subornation of peIjury than it is to
omission, and some federal courts have ruled that a prosecutor's knowing use of peIjured testimony in the grand
jury violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment See infra note 196. Note that a direct Fifth
Amendment challenge was not raised in Williams. Moreover, Congress has acted to criminalize false
declarations of material fact before the grand jury. See 18 U.S.C. 1623 (1999). Where distortion borders on an
intentional falsehood, a federal court seeking to exercise its superintendence power over the grand jury to
prevent misleading presentations by a prosecutor would be implementing the will of Congress and acting to
deter violations of a statute "carefully drafted and approved by ... the Congress to ensure the integrity of the
grand jury's functions." United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,46 (1992), (quoting United States v. Mechanik,
457 U.S. 66.74 (1986» (O'Connor, J. concurring).
183. Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 466 N.E.2d 828, 829 (Mass. 1984).
The reasoning of Co/kley has become the prevailing view.1S1 Omissions in search
and arrest warrant affidavits will be scrutinized to determine whether the
challenged omissions made the application misleading; if they did, the warrant
appliCation as a whole may be considered a "deliberate falsehood" within the
meaning of Franks. Then and only then must the court tum to the question of
materiality and determine whether the inclusion of the omitted material in the
affidavit would have negated probable cause.
The Franks standard for determining when a search is invalid under the Fourth
Amendment would map well in determining when an omission before the grand
jury should result in dismissal of the indictment. Applying this framework,
states182 should dismiss indictments where the defendant has proven that: 1)
substantial exculpatory evidence was in possession of the prosecutor; 2) the
prosecutor knowingly or recklessly failed to disclose it to the grand jury in order
to distort the grand jury presentation; and 3) reviewing the grand jury transcript,
coupled with the improperly omitted material, the court determines that there is
no probable cause to support the indictment.
Unlike the situation in which exculpatory evidence is simply withheld, where
the evidence presented to the grand jury has been distorted by the prosecutor, or
the grand jury has been told a "half truth," the prosecutor may be viewed as
affirmatively misleading or deceiving the grand jury. Although not expressly
recognizing that it was doing so, Massachusetts has applied a modified Franks
approach to challenges of grand jury omissions, ruling that an indictment may be
dismissed where "the integrity of the grand jury proceeding [is] impaired by an
unfair and misleading presentation." 183 In Commonwealth v. O'Dell, the Su-
preme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment where the prosecu-
tor introduced to the grand jury only that portion of a defendant's post-arrest
statement linking him to the crime of armed robbery (presence and assistance in
the getaway car), without also introducing the exculpatory portion of the same
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statement wherein the defendant denied knowing that his co-defendant "had any
intention of pulling a robbery. ,,184 The Court ruled that withholding this exculpa-
tory piece of the defendant's statement "distorted the portion that was repeated to
the grand jury" 185 in such a way as to seriously impair the integrity of the
proceedings. The Massachusetts high court has likened such distortion to
'''selling' the grand jury 'shoddy merchandise' without appropriate disclaim-
ers.',IS6 The Massachusetts court's focus in O'Dell was thus not on the adequacy
of the evidence before the grand jury, but on the integrity of the grand jury
proceedings themselves.
Application of the Franks distortion standard to grand jury omissions has at
least three distinct advantages over the "substantial exculpatory evidence"
approach presently taken in many states. First, to mandate an evidentiary hearing,
the defendant's attack on the indictment must be more than conclusory; it must
allege deliberate or reckless distortion of the grand jury presentation, and it must
be accompanied by a detailed offer of proof by way of affidavit. 187 If courts
strictly adhere to this requirement of a preliminary showing, many claims will be
denied at an early stage, without even reaching the issue of intent to mislead,
because either the facts alleged to have been omitted from the presentation did
not distort the presentation before the grand jury, or they were not so substantial
as to negate probable cause when viewed in the context of the entire presenta-
tion. ISS Only in those rare cases where the defendant makes an adequate
threshold showing of both (~f these prerequisites should the court hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prosecutor's omission was inten-
184. [d. at 830.
185. [d. at 829.
186. Commonwealth v. Connor, 467 N.E.2d 1340,1351 (Mass. 1984) (quoting Commonwealth v. St. Pierre,
.387 N.E.2d. 1135,1139 (1979». Two years after O'Dell, the Supreme Judicial Court expanded on this concept
of grand jury "impairment," by ruling that false evidence presented to the grand jury may also, in limited
circumstances, distort the presentation and warrant dismissal of an indictment. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield,
500 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Mass. 1986). Addressing a claim that a police witness before the grand jury
misrepresented the proximity of the defendant's cigarette lighter to the body of the victim, the Court found that
although the detective's grand jury testimony was somewhat misleading, it did not warrant dismissal of the
. indictment. [d. at 78()-81. "The defendant has not proved that [the detective] knowingly testified falsely
concerning the cigarette lighter, or testified in reckless disregard of the truth, on a matter that was probably
significant to the grand jury's deliberations." See ill. at 781. Mayfield thus seems to add to the O'Dell
"distortion" test two prerequisites: (I) the false or misleading evidence was presented by the government with
knowledge of its falsity, or in reckless disregard for its truth, and (2) the false or misleading evidence was
"probably" significant to the grand jury's deliberations. See id. at 780-81. In short, to prove distortion in
Massachusetts the defendant must now show both materiality and some bad faith on the part of the government,
both of which are also prerequisites under the Franks test.
187. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 170 (1978) ("The requirement of a substantial preliminary
showing would suffice to prevent the misuse of a veracity hearing for the purposes of discovery or
obstruction.").
188. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 170. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Bergin, 574 A.2d 164, 169 (Conn. 1990)
(allegation of omission in motion to suppress did not warrant hearing, where, even if intentional, the omission
was not so material as to negate probable cause).
tional and purposefully designed to mislead. Thus, there need not be any new
large scale commitment of judicial resources in applying a modified Franks
distortion standard to alleged omissions before the grand jury. 189
Second, a distortion standard by its nature requires a reviewing court to
consider the evidence omitted in light of what was included in the grand jury
presentation; only when the absence of the omitted material makes the evidence
presented misleading would a finding of deliberate falsehood be warranted. This
approach recognizes that there are frequently volumes of material which could be
made available to the grand jury, contrary conclusions or opinions which could
be rendered by other witnesses, and innumerable leads or fragments of informa-
tion which could have been pursued. Focusing on distortion rather than omission
harmonizes a prosecutors duty not to allow perjured testimony, with a prosecu-
tor's right at the grand jury stage not to present every conceivable piece of
evidence which might ultimately be introduced at trial.
In this regard, the gang rape scenario in State v. Scherzer amply illustrates the
important difference between a pure omission standard and a distortion standard,
and the reasons why a distortion standard is more workable. The New Jersey
189. This framework presupposes that defense lawyers will be allowed to inspect the grand jury minutes if
necessary in order to advance colorable claims of material omissions. While not all states routinely allow
defense counsel to inspect copies of the grand jury minutes during pre-trial discovery, even among states which
do not allow defendants copies of the grand jury minutes as a matter of right in every criminal case, many states
permit such inspection upon a showing of particularized need, such as where the defendant files a motion to
dismiss the indictment against him properly raising a claim of misconduct or irregularity in the grand jury
proceedings. See Annotation, Inspection of Certain Particular Portions of Minutes, ZO A.L.R. 3d 7 (Supp.
1998). Thus, where a defendant by affidavit has raised a claim that important exculpatory evidence was in
possession of the prosecutor prior to indictment, and an articulable suspicion that such evidence was not
disclosed by the prosecutor to the grand jury, the court may inspect the grand jury minutes in camera to
determine whether such evidence was disclosed by the prosecutor, and if not, whether there has been a threshold
showing ofparticularized need by the defendant sufficient to order disclosure of the grand jury minutes in order
to allow the defendant to advance a colorable motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Oregon v. Harwood, 609 P,Zd 1312,
1314-15 (Or. App. 1980) (requiring that the entire supporting affidavit be examined in light of controverting
statements given at a hearing).
Another potential hurdle to the application of the Franks standard by state courts to gra.I!d jury presentations
is the harmless error standard of review which has been applied to grand jury irregularities in the federal courts.
In United States v, Meehanik, the Supreme Court ruled that certain claims of grand jury irregularity may not be
raised on appeal following conviction, because the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by a petit jury
renders any defect in the initial finding of probable cause harmless. 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986). The claim iIi
Mechanik involved a Rule 6(d) violation, that is, the unauthorized presence of persons other than the witness
and the prosecutor in the grand jury. The Supreme Court was careful to limit its harmless error analysis to Rule
6(d) claims raised during the course of trial, but it is unclear whether its reasoning would bar post-conviction
appeals based on claims of other grand jury misconduct. See id. at 72. A number of states have expressly
declined to follow Mechanik on post-conviction review of state law claims pertaining to defects in the grand
jury, finding that an intervening conviction does not render the claim of grand jury error harmless. See
Minnesota v. Johnson, 463 N.W.Zd 527, 531 (Minn. 1990); People v. Wilkins, 68 N.Y.2d 269, 277 (N,Y. 1986).
Even on the federal level, at least one court of appeals has expressly limited Meehanik to "technical" violations
of Rule 6, and has refused to apply it to more serious claims of grand jury irregularity which affect the
"fundamental fairness" of the criminal process. See United States v. Taylor, 798 F.Zd 1337, 1339 (10th Cir.
1986). A distorted or misleading grand jury presentation arguably undermines the fundamental fairness and
integrity of the proceedings themselves.
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190. Compare Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 466 N.E.2d 828, 829 (Mass. 1984) (presentation of inculpatory
portion of defendant's post arrest statement and exclusion of exculpatory portion rendered grand jury
presentation misleading) with People v. Reynolds, 420 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Ill. App. 1981) (suppressing fruits of
warranted search where police officer intentionally omitted from search warrant application in armed robbery
case the time and place where the suspect had been subject to a traffic stop, which information, if it had been
included in search warrant affidavit, would have made clear that following the armed robbery the suspect was
traveling in direction opposite to his apartment, and could not have concealed the fruits of the robbery at
location opined in the warrant).
191. United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980) (search warrant affidavit was supported
by probable cause even if identity of informant had been revealed). See also Washington v. Garrison, 827 P.2d
1388, 1391 (Wash. 1992) (in applying Franks test to alleged omission from search warrant affidavit of statement
by defendant's boyfriend that defendant may have moved stolen merchandise from her apartment, test of
materiality was not whether issuing magistrate might have been swayed by this information, but whether a court
reviewing the affidavit after the fact determines that omitted material negates probable cause).
appellate division upheld the prosecutor's discretion not to introduce this evi-
dence, ruling that it was not "clearly exculpatory." But certainly it was exculpa-
tory, in the sense that, had the grand jury believed the defense experts, they could
not have found probable cause to support an essential element of the crime; that
is, that the victim was mentally defective. But by failing to call to the grand jury
the psychiatric experts proffered by the defense, the prosecutor was not distorting
the medical evidence presented from its own experts. Evidence that Expert A
holds opinion B is not distorted by the omission of evidence that Expert C holds
opinion D. Experts can have different opinions, and it is for the ultimate trier of
fact to determine which, if either, is credible. A "substantial exculpatory
evidence" standard requires a prosecutor to second guess every piece of allegedly
exculpatory evidence and try to determine what might be considered probative by
the grand jury, forcing him into a dual role during the ex parte proceeding of both
advocate for the state and advocate for the accused. But a distortion standard
allows a prosecutor to be assured that so long as the omitted material does not
bear so directly on evidence included in the grand jury presentation that its
omission distorts the meaning of the evidence presented, the presentation will be
upheld. 190
Finally, the Franks paradigm imposes a" standard of materiality which gives
due deference to the grand jury's determination of probable cause, and which
presumes this determination to be valid. Unlike the standard "tends to negate
probable cause," adopted by a number of states which have undertaken a limited
duty of grand jury disclosure, and echoed in the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice, the Franks approach would require the defendant to prove that the
omitted evidence would have actually made a difference. The appropriate test is
not whether the omitted evidence "tended" to negate probable cause or "might"
have affected the grand jury's decision, but whether the grand jury minutes
supplemented by the omitted material could not have supported the existence of
probable cause. 191 A Franks standard thus orients the court toward a more
objective inquiry; a court reviewing a claim that a prosecutor intentionally
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distorted the evidence before the grand jury may dismiss the indictment only
where it determines, after reviewing the grand jury minutes in conjunction with
the omitted material, that the grand jury could not have indicted had they not been
mislead. Where the grand jury could reasonably have returned the indictment even
after considering the omitted evidence, the indictment should be upheld. 192
One may argue that the Franks framework is inapposite to the grand jury
context because a court has no power after Costello to dismiss a grand jury
indictment not supported by probable cause; if the evidence before the grand jury
is not reviewed for sufficiency, why should it be reviewed for veracity?193 First,
not all state courts follow the Supreme Court's rule in Costello and decline to
review the sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury.194 More importantly,
intentional distortion of evidence is more akin to perjury than it is to omission.
Notwithstanding Costello, a number of federal courts have either ruled or'
suggested that a prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony before the grand
jury violates the Fifth Amendment. 195 In the now famous· words of Justice
Sutherland, "while [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to .
strike foul ones." 196 A prosecutor owes a duty of good faith both to the grand jury
and to the defendant. 197 Intentional distortion, unlike mere omission, clearly
raises the specter of bad faith, or, in Justice Sutherland's words, a "foul blow."
Whether the omission of a particular piece of exculpatory evidence has a
distorting effect will vary from case to case depending on the interrelationship
between the nature of the evidence presented and the importance of the evidence .
omitted. However, certain general conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing
analysis. For example, where the prosecutor introduces evidence of forensic tests
performed on a weapon found at a crime scene which link the defendant to the
crime (e.g., by fingerprints), it would be a distortion to fail to inform the grand
jury of other tests performed on the same weapon which were negative or
inconclusive (e.g., DNA sampling). Similarly, it would be a distortion to
introduce a portion of a defendant's post arrest statement to the police, without,
including an exculpatory portion of the same statement on the same subject
192. See United States v. Meting, 47 E3d 1546, 1554 (9th Cir. 1995) (wiretap application which omitted
infonnant's criminal history and mental illness need not be suppressed, where probable cause existed for .
issuance of wiretap order even after considering omitted material). See also United States v. Udziela, 671 F.2d
995, 1001 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying same standard of materiality to use of perjured testimony in grand jury).
193. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
194. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
195. See United States v. Basurto, 497 E2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974). Interestingly. in Basurto the Ninth.
Circuit based its decision on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the grand jury clause. [d. See
also United States v. Adamo, 742 E2d 927, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1984) ("the Due Process Clause of the Fiftb
Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on an indictment that the government knows is based'
partially on perjured testimony"). Cf Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (prosecutor's knowing use:
of perjured testimony at trial violates Due Process).
196. Berger v. United States. 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), quoted in United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 62
(1992) (Stevens, 1. dissenting).
197. Basurto, 497 F.2d at 786.
198. See, e.g., Oregon v. Harwood. 609 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Or. App. 1980) (stating that no case "requires a
prosecutor to present all evidence which may be exculpatory, only that which clearly would have negated guilt
or undermined the authority of the grand jury to act at all") (internal quotations omitted).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 783 F. Supp. 1058, 1078 (N.D. lll. 1991) (failure to mention
informant's "about face" in search warrant application did not violate Franks).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957,963 (8th Cir. 1986) (failure to mention promise of
le~ency to informant in search warrant application did not violate Franks). I
I
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These omissions render the portion of evidence presented to the grand jury
misleading.
Other omissions clearly are not a distortion within the meaning of Franks. The
government should be under no general obligation to infonn the grand jury of
general denials of the crime made by the defendant,198 prior inconsistent
statements made by government witnesses,199 or other evidence reflecting on the
credibility of witnesses before the grand jury, such as bias or inducements.2oo
None of these types of exculpatory evidence directly and objectively modify the
inculpatory evidence presented to the grand jury; that is, the defendant may
falsely deny the crime while others honestly insist on his guilt, a witness may
have recounted the facts -innocently but inaccurately on a prior occasion yet give
a correct account before the grand jury, or a witness might have a variety of
palpable motivations for lying, yet still testify truthfully.
Where, however, the omitted material directly modifies the evidence presented
to the grand jury such that its omission rises to the level of misrepresentation, a
prosecutor should produce it. For example, as stated above, a prosecutor should
be under no general duty to disclose to the grand jury evidence that a cooperating
witness has made a deal with the government, and the details of this plea bargain.
However, if this same crucial witness states or implies to the grand jury that he
has come forward solely because he wants to "do the right thing," suggesting that
his cooperation is the result of moral conviction rather than inducement, it would
be a distortion within the meaning of Franks not to correct this misstatement and
disclose to the grand jury the parameters of the plea bargain.
The question of whether to present alibi evidence to the grand jury presents
perhaps one of the most difficult dilemmas faced by a prosecutor. Many
prosecutors who are aware that the target of a grand jury investigation has an alibi
defense will for strategic reasons call the purported alibi witness to testify at the
grand jury, in order to test the witness's memory under oath and discover in
advance of trial his strength as a witness. Other prosecutors will do so out of an
overriding sense of fairness, consistent with their ethical duty to pursue "justice"
rather than merely to advocate for convictions. While there are strong policy
reasons for encouraging prosecutors to present alibi witnesses, failure to do so
would not constitute "distortion" sufficient to cause the dismissal of the indict-
ment under a Franks test. Imagine an armed robbery case where the store clerk
identifies the defendant as the robber, and the defendant's brother provides an
alibi. Although it would be impossible for the grand jury to believe both the clerk
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and the brother, omission of the brother's statement at the grand jury stage would
not be distortive of the clerk's presentation under the foregoing analysis; that is,
the brother's testimony does not so directly modify or alter the clerk's testimony
that to omit one and include the other makes the grand jury presentation
misleading.
Imagine an armed robbery case where the store clerk identifies the defendant
as the robber, and the defendant's brother provides an alibi. Although it would be
impossible for the grand jury to believe both the clerk and the brother, the
omission of the brother's statement at the grand jury stage would not be distortive
of the clerk's presentation. However, there certainly may be strategic rather than
legal or ethical reasons why a prosecutor would call the brother to testify in the
grand jury, including testing his memory under oath and discovering in advance
of trial his strength as a witness.
Nor should the prosecutor be under an obligation to introduce evidence of
affirmative defenses which might be available, such as self defense or insanity, so
long as he does not distort any evidence which he voluntarily introduces on such
issues of intent. 201 Although requiring production of affirmative defenses would
aid the grand jury in ex~rcising its screening function, it would do so only at the
combined cost of forcing the prosecutor into the role and mindset of a defense
attorney and turning the preliminary probable cause determination into a mini-
trial on the merits.
This distortion standard should apply only to the intentional omission of
evidence supporting the factual, not legal, innocence of the accused. Examples of
situations where the defendant may be factually guilty (that is, he committed the
proscribed offense with the requisite intent) but legally innocent (the law does not
recognize him as guilty) include those cases where a confession was coerced, a
search was illegal, the statute of limitations had expired, essential evidence was
inadmissible, or some other procedural rule operated to bar a conviction. While
some commentators have argued that consideration of legal innocence by the
201. In a seminal piece predating the Williams decision, Professor Arenella proposed several significant
refonus of the federal grand jury, including what he conceded was a "tentative suggestion" ,for imposing an
obligation on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Arenella, supra note 18, at 567.
Arenella recommended a distinction between evidence that directly negates an essential element of the crime,
which he argued should be the subject of mandatory disclosure, and evidence that supports an affirmative
defense, which a prosecutor need not produce.
Arenella's "compromise" proposal breaks down when one looks at how elastically most courts, and even
Professor Arenella, would define "directly negates guilt" under Brady, particularly with regard to impeachment
material. At one point in his brief discussion of the issue, Arenella suggests that, "If the prosecutor is aware of
reliable infonuation which raises substantial doubt about the credibility of a material witness" that evidence
should be produced; in the same paragraph, however, Arenella suggests that general "credibility issues"
concerning the government's witnesses need not be the subject of mandatory disclosure. [d. at 567-68. This
attempted distinction between "serious" or "substantial" issues pertaining to the credibility of a government
witness and more "general" credibility issues shows the flaws inherent in a "substantial exculpatory evidence"
approach to the government's disclosure obligations at the grand jury stage, and highlights the benefits of the
distortion approach. For how is a prosecutor to decide whether impeachment material raises a "substantial
doubt" about a witness' credibility, without placing himself in the position of the fact finder?
202. See Leipold, supra note 17, at 289; Arenella, supra note 18, at 480.
203. United States v. Seruba, 604 F,2d 807, 817 (3rd Cir. 1979).
204. Arenella, supra note 18, at 509.
205. ld. at 512.
grand jury should be mandatory in order to prevent unwarranted trials,202 they
overlook the public's interest in seeing the guilty brought to justice through an
open and visible process. Because the grand jury operates in secrecy, encouraging
the grand jury to "no bill" a case where the defendant is factually guilty but
legally innocent would bring public disrespect upon the criininal justice system.
Where the grand jury declines to return an indictment of a factually guilty person
on the basis oflegal innocence, the public's ability to comprehend and respect the
criminal justice process may have been compromised. For this reason, only those
exculpatory facts which support factual innocence of the accused should be the
subject of a Franks distortion analysis.
CONCLUSION
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The prosecutor's duty to pursue justice-and to protect the fundamental
" fairness of criminal proceedings whose basic aim is justice - may be at its apex
in the grand jury. There, the prosecutor's presentation of facts and law "operates
,without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and [is] virtually
immune from public scrutiny. ,,203
It is fallacious to conclude that a trial on the merits will expose all exculpatory
evidence and exonerate an innocent defendant. The costs to a putative defendant
, arising from a prosecutor's breach of his fundamental duty of fairness in the
grand jury cannot be overestimated. First, there are substantial costs associated
with indictment which will not be remedied even by a subsequent acquittal, such
as the expense of mounting a defense and the ongoing damage to one's
reputation. Second, because so many indictments are resolved by plea bargains
rather than by trial,204 and because reasons apart from factual guilt might lead a
defendant to plead guilty,205 one cannot assume that all falsely accused defen-
. dants will be exonerated.
To check prosecutorial abuse, states should impose upon prosecutors the duty
to disclose to the grand jury all substantial and admissible exculpatory evidence
.- that is, evidence that primarily suggests either that the defendant did not
commit the crime, or that someone else did - wherever omitting such facts
;would constitute a distortion of the evidence presented. State courts are accus-
;tomed to applying a similar standard in reviewing search warrants after Franks v.
. Delaware. Although this reform would impose some costs on the judicial system,
they could be offset by the judicial resources saved by the nonlitigation of
,. unmeritorious charges. Even were this not the case, however, fairness to defen-
,dants and the dictates of justice would be advanced by promoting more balanced
;presentations of evidence before the grand jury.
